Shannon vs Chesapeake

**Berthier** · 12-27-2011, 19:04

Hmm that is an interesting statement.

On first reading it is counter-intuitive, even on second reading...but it cant easily be argued against either way since any argument will become circular- ie the best side won because it was best, or the worst side lost because it was worst. Either way, you argue is based on assumptions of fact that one or other was best or worst and the result of the battle follows, but it works in reverse that the result of the battle tells which side was best/worst. I'm not sure the argument would be too productive!

**Pirate Queen** · 12-27-2011, 19:43

I think you ignore one salient fact: any RN ship was expected to beat any foreign ship of the same class, and often 2 or more. Any RN captain that didn't engage an enemy of the same rate would not just have been court-martialed, he himself would have expected to win, often handily.

It took a while before the capabilities of the 44-gun "pocket battleships" of the USN were appreciated, vs the 32-gun 'cruisers". Even more to the point, instead of the RN reliably having better crews than their enemies, here they were up against at least their equals, often their betters.

The after-action reports took some time to reach London; and some more time to be disseminated through the fleet. The basics came soon, but lessons learnt from the details took longer. The first actions could be (and were) dismissed as anomalies. It was only towards the end of the war that most got the word. Some never did (in particular, the RN SW Pacific fleet. as it was).

**Berthier** · 12-27-2011, 21:31

Hey Zoe, welcome to the anchorage, check in the "Welcome Aboard" forum!

**David Manley** · 12-27-2011, 23:56

So, just on losses alone, the frigates lost twice as many of their number as the SoLs.

That's an incredibly simplistic analysis, and fails to take into account the roles of the vessels, numbers of vessels, the operational profiles, actions fought etc. Its also an incredibly short list (I wonder what the French or Spanish equivalent would look like?). Looking at another era the USN's losses in cruisers in WW2 far outweighed its losses in battleships and aircraft carriers. Did this mean the USN considered its cruisers "out of favour"? No, of course not. It meant the cruisers were engaged far more regularly than their bigger cousins, and suffered accordingly.

IMHO Gardiner's book (one of the best works on frigate warfare) actually illustrates that the Admiralty did indeed take a great deal of interest in the design and operation of its frigate force, but that force was designed to deal with the threat at the time (the French and the Spanish) against which it did very, very well. OK, so the performance against a new enemy wasn't startling (quite the reverse) - but that has been, is, and will be a feature of warfare. We have seen it recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. western armies designed to take the fight very successfully to enemies in the field, given all shades of hell by asymmetric forces and it has taken many, many years to retrain, re-equip and remould those armies in such a way as to be able to respond effectively. Yet no-one says "the losses of infantry compared with tankies is considerably higher so obviously the infantry is out of favour with the Pentagon"). It is also important to recognise the constraints - in particular those of manpower, finance, materiel and administration - within which navies operated at the time. Gardiner's book does a good job in covering those aspects as well.

As an aside I think it would be amusing to see Mr Gardiner's reaction to his book being used to support a theory that the frigate force was out of favour. I might well drop him or his team a line.

**David Manley** · 12-28-2011, 00:04

The after-action reports took some time to reach London; and some more time to be disseminated through the fleet. The basics came soon, but lessons learnt from the details took longer. The first actions could be (and were) dismissed as anomalies. It was only towards the end of the war that most got the word. Some never did (in particular, the RN SW Pacific fleet. as it was).

That in itself is a very good point, well made (Hi Zoe, btw :) ). "Old hands" amongst the naval wargaming and historian community will be well aware, but newbies and "casual" players are often completely surprised by the speed of communication (or rather the lack of it) and the knock-on effect it had on naval operations. Especially at the beginning and the end of a war or campaign (how many times do we read of ships that were lost because they were unaware that a conflict had broken out, and the seemingly friendly sail was now an enemy, or of ships or even major land actions fought days, weeks or even months after the signing of a peace treaty simply because the news hadn't travelled there yet?). If you want to get agood appreciation of these effects then play out a multi-player campaign over just a few months and impose a strict system of communication that recreates the time lag, sit back and enjoy the fun. Or for a more "up to date" example (albeit from the 1980s) play GDW's 5th Frontier War :)

**David Manley** · 12-28-2011, 00:26

I'm not sure the argument would be too productive!

Its a matter of perspective. If you want to make someone look good then you would laud their victory. If you wanted to do them down then you could express it in terms of "meh, the other guy threw it away". War, sport, politics, its all the same. The winner is the guy/team/party/army who makes the least mistakes. Of course "he won it/ he lost it" are perfectly valid views, the important thing is to be consistent in one's approach.

**Berthier** · 12-28-2011, 00:34

More frigate stuff

The other considerations are that ships take a long time to build. Even when the RN recognized their frigates would have trouble matching the new US super frigates, change cant happen overnight. But change was happening already anyway.

In Henderson's book "Frigates" he has two tables at the back of the book that nicely illustrate what was happening in the RN wrt frigates. He compares the size of the RN in 1794 to that of 1814 and also compares frigates between the two years.

First off just looking at ships in full commission and reserve/repair

1794 total vessels including unrated 328 of which first to third rates (the battle line for want of a better term) made up 117 and frigates 93
1814 total vessels 657 (vast majority were unrated vessels) of which first to third rates were 118 and frigates 132

Secondly comparing the type of frigates between the two periods
1794 all frigates were 28-38 main batteries, majority(64 out of 93 vessels) were 28-32 with a tonnage of 600-750tons
1814 frigates ranged from 32-44 main batteries, majority (108 out of 132) were now 36-38 guns with a tonnage of 950-1050tons. There were another nine frigates that were even bigger

Points to note then are the number of frigates increased by 42% in the period BUT SOL numbers did not increase at all (well +1)
The size of the average frigate increased by almost 50% in the period as well

The figures of course may be misleading as they represent the start of the french Revolutionary Wars and the end at which time the RN was not seriously challenged by any European power and the challenge from the US Navy was from heavy frigates and smaller only. Nonetheless they would on the surface indicate a policy of maintenance of a certain size big ship force and a steady increase in the jack of all trades frigate (or cruiser as they would later morph in to). The increase in number and size of frigates must have begun prior to the conflict with the US as I dont believe the dockyards could have built that many larger ships in the 12-20 months from the start of the war of 1812 to the end of 1814.

**csadn** · 12-28-2011, 16:12

Originally Posted by Pirate Queen

I think you ignore one salient fact: any RN ship was expected to beat any foreign ship of the same class, and often 2 or more. Any RN captain that didn't engage an enemy of the same rate would not just have been court-martialed, he himself would have expected to win, often handily.

It took a while before the capabilities of the 44-gun "pocket battleships" of the USN were appreciated, vs the 32-gun 'cruisers". Even more to the point, instead of the RN reliably having better crews than their enemies, here they were up against at least their equals, often their betters.

Exactly -- it's worth noting: No less a RN personage than Horatio Nelson had allowed as how the US frigates were a worthy concern (there is a report of him watching _Constitution_ leaving harbor quite smartly, to which he commented "in the handling of those ships lies a world of difficulty for the Royal Navy"). The USN and the RN shared several features, coming as they did from a shared background; but the USN changed just enough of the details to make working conditions a bit better. (Here's a statement which will really annoy some folks: Horatio Nelson would have made a great US admiral, not least because in many ways he acted like one. :) ) The problem with the British frigate force stemmed from the expectation that they would not be fighting frequently -- they were used as tools for training new officers, and carried the much-lighter armament and speed-uber-alles design Broke complained about; whereas the US frigate force was the striking arm of the USN. The British were caught out (for example look up the term "fir frigates"); but to their credit, they learned, and started building their own heavies and providing better training for their crews (finishing off Napoleon also helped... :) ).

Originally Posted by Berthier

On first reading it is counter-intuitive, even on second reading...but it cant easily be argued against either way since any argument will become circular- ie the best side won because it was best, or the worst side lost because it was worst. Either way, you argue is based on assumptions of fact that one or other was best or worst and the result of the battle follows, but it works in reverse that the result of the battle tells which side was best/worst.

"Proof of the pudding", and all that -- but it is possible to look at what was being done leading up to a conflict, and see the points (note plural -- rarely is it ever one thing which leads to victory, or defeat) where the winning side got it right, and/or the losing side got it wrong. It helps when some amount of time has passed since the battle in question, when documents finally get released (either by gov'ts, or by the estates of those involved), and one can see where one writer's story doesn't match up with everyone else's, or find out what folks really thought of a particular person (it's hysterical to reads the comments of those who knew George Custer, and those who didn't, post-Little-Bighorn; the latter, think he's a god; the former flat-out loathe him).

The link posted re the Battle of Lake Erie is an example of this: The US got it right by cranking out units as swiftly as possible, but then badly mishandled the actual battle to where if _Lawrence_ had not been able to unship a boat (and thus allow Perry to shift from _Lawrence_ to _Niagara_), the British might well have won outright; the British erred by not cranking out as many ships (tho' there's an argument that they could not have crewed and/or armed any more than they had), but handled their force far better than the US. Both sides did right, and both sides did wrong; and it could easily have gone either way.

[Off-topicness follows:]

Originally Posted by Anav

So did General Grant win the war or did Lee lose it?

I'd have to say Lee lost his part of it; but then, the DC-Richmond theatre was an overblown sideshow, later made to look important due to who was involved (see later).. The war was truly being won (and lost) in Tennessee (hint: Nashville was the second-largest manufacturing city in the South; Atlanta was third), on the Mississippi River (who controls the river, controls trade), and along the coast at the various ports (the South being dependent upon imports, capture of the ports means no war material -- including food and medicine -- coming in, and no income-generating supplies going out; this is why the Red River Campaign actually occurred, BTW -- and part of why it failed).

However, thanks to what is called "the Ohio Mafia" (Grant, Sherman, and their supporters) by some, names like George Thomas, Patrick Cleburne, Chickamauga, and Missionary Ridge have been flensed from the histories, in favor of the version currently taught in schools where the War takes place only between DC and Richmond.

Interesting historical alternative: Lee does not engage in his misguided attempts to invade the North (see above about "losing his part of it"); and instead continues his proto-trench-warfare along the eastern approaches to Richmond, thus being able to hold off the Army of the Potomac beyond April 1865. Meanwhile, Sherman's March through Georgia and the Carolinas continues apace -- historically, at the time of Appomattox, Sherman's army was some 150 miles from Richmond, in Durham county, North Carolina. Picture if you will: One morning, Grant wakes up in the Union trenches outside Richmond -- and discovers that in the night, Sherman hit Richmond from the *west*, forcing Lee to surrender. What does that do to the carefully-crafted image of "Grant the Conqueror", and his subsequent attempt to become President?

**David Manley** · 12-29-2011, 02:29

Here's a statement which will really annoy some folks: Horatio Nelson would have made a great US admiral, not least because in many ways he acted like one.

Can't see why that would annoy anyone. Many RN senior officers would have done well in the USN and vice versa, the "common ancestry" and shared ethos helping considerably. And it is a trait that continues to this day. From my personal experiences overseas secondments between the ABCANZ nations often work VERY well (and not due to the language issues). RN exchanges with the RNethN also work very well - same mindset :)

**Berthier** · 12-29-2011, 02:52

And for those of you who may not know, as a young man, Napoleon considered running away to join the RN. What a different world we would be in then!

**Mark Barker** · 12-29-2011, 10:31

You go away for a few days for Christmas with the family and things really get going on the Forums ....

Where to start ?

"For instance: _Constitution_/_Guerierre_ -- I cannot find anywhere any indication either ship was in any way mismanaged, either in general operation or in the tactics of the battle; both captains were on the ball; both crews were as good as they were ever going to be; both ships were in decent nick".

No - Guerriere was way overdue for a refit and her masts and rigging in poor condition. Did not make any difference to the actual engagement but it is worth noting for accuracy if setting up a game. Reasons that Constitution won, she was significantly bigger, much more heavily armed, much more strongly built (Guerriere was a French prize and therefore more lightly built than a standard British frigate, which were of course already more lightly constructed that the Humphries frigates) and she had a crew that were at least the equal of the British. Guerriere had no advantages to exploit. That and the British had developed an attitude that they only needed to turn up to win (an attitude that Lawrence also developed after his easy victory to his cost).

On the general point that the British frigate arm was ignored in comparison to the SOLs - "it is a capital mistake to theorise before one has all the facts".

If you are going to use exchange ratios to measure combat effectiveness you are going to need better data than a partial extract from Wiki.

The reason that more frigates were lost compared to SOLs is that there were more of them (120+ frigates in 1812) in service and they were expected to go "into harm's way" - blockade, harrass, attack, defend convoys, control sea space etc - not just scout.

A quick look for the French Revolutionary War (1793-1801) shows something in the order of 45 frigate-size ships captured from the French, with 8 going the other way. With around 20 captures from the AWI and 30 from the Napoleonic War the exchange ratio seems to give a somewhat different picture.

As anyone who has seen the French and Spanish Atlantic coasts will know, blockading and scouting required training and seamanship of the highest order - otherwise the result was fatal. Loss records of the time show 2-3 times more losses due to weather and navigational hazard than enemy action.

Nelson's famous quote during the Nile Campaign "were I to die now, want of frigates would be found stamped on my heart" shows how important that arm of the service was considered to be.

Source for captures - David Lyon - Sailing Navy List (or Rif Winfield's more recent works)

Source for losses - David Hepper - British Warship Losses in the Age of Sail

For a really good study of the frigate arm of the service, including the time served and competence of commanders I would suggest Tom Wareham's "Star Captains".

Best regards,

Mark Barker
The Inshore Squadron

**csadn** · 12-30-2011, 14:44