Shannon vs Chesapeake

[David Manley]

The wiki article on this covers much more ground. This is the "interesting" bit.

Initial engagement

The two ships met at half past five in the afternoon, 20 nautical miles east of Boston lighthouse, between Cape Ann and Cape Cod. Shannon was flying a rusty blue ensign and her dilapidated outside appearance after a long period at sea suggested that she would be an easy opponent. Observing the Chesapeake's many flags, a sailor had questioned Broke: "Mayn't we have three ensigns, sir, like she has?" "No," said Broke, "we've always been an unassuming ship."

Shannon refused to fire upon Chesapeake as she bore down, nor would Chesapeake rake Shannon despite having the weather gauge. Lawrence's behavior that day earned him praise from the British officers for gallantry. The two ships opened fire just before 18:00 at a range of about 35 metres, with Shannon scoring the first hit, striking the Chesapeake on one of her gunports with two round shot and a bag of musket balls fired by William Mindham, the gun captain of one of Shannon's starboard 18-pounders. Two or three further broadsides followed that swept the Chesapeake's decks with grape and roundshot from Shannon's 32-pounder carronades. Shannon ran into Chesapeake, with Chesapeake lying athwart Shannon's starboard bow, trapped by one of Shannon's anchors.

Shannon now opened fire on the Chesapeake's maindeck with her after guns firing through the Chesapeake's port holes. Many of Chesapeake's crew were killed or wounded; two thirds of her gun crews were already casualties. The Chesapeake’s wheel was then shot away and her helmsman killed by a 9-pounder gun that Broke had ordered installed on the quarter deck for that very purpose.

With Chesapeake trapped against the Shannon and unable to manoeuvre, Chesapeake's stern now became exposed to raking British fire. Her situation worsened when a small open cask of musket cartridges abaft the mizzen-mast blew up. When the smoke cleared, Captain Broke judged the time was right and gave the order to board. Lawrence too tried to give the order to board, but the British were faster.

Mr Stevens, the boatswain attempted to lash the two ships together to prevent the Chesapeake from disengaging and escaping. This bravery cost him an arm. A party of small-arm men rushed aboard the Chesapeake, led by Broke and including the purser, Mr G. Aldham, and the clerk, Mr John Dunn. Aldham and Dunn were killed as they crossed the gangway, but the rest of the party made it onto the Chesapeake.

"Captain Broke, at the head of not more that [sic?] twenty men, stepped from the rail of the waist-hammock netting to the muzzle of the after-carronade of the Chesapeake, and sprang from thence upon her quarterdeck."

The main-deck was found to be empty, having been swept clear by Shannon’s broadsides. Broke and his men quickly advanced forward along the deck, while more British reinforcements leapt aboard.

Meanwhile, the first lieutenant, Mr George T. L. Watt, had attempted to hoist the British colours over the Chesapeake, but was hit in the forehead by grapeshot as he did so. Fighting had now broken out along the top-masts of the ships as rival sharpshooters fired upon the their opponents in their rival's masts, and on the sailors on the exposed decks. The British marksmen, led by Midshipman William Smith, who had command of the fore-top, stormed the Chesapeake's fore-top over the yard-arm and killed all the Americans there.

Captain Broke himself led a charge against a number of the Americans who had managed to rally on the forecastle. After four minutes of fierce fighting, the Americans called for quarter, but then, finding that they out-numbered the British, they rallied and counter attacked. Three American sailors, probably from the rigging, descended and attacked Captain Broke. Although taken by surprise, he killed the first. Still, the second hit him with a musket, which stunned him, while the third sliced open his skull with his sabre, knocking Broke to the deck. Before the American could finish Broke off, he was cut down by William Windham. Shannon's crew rallied to the defence of their captain and carried the forecastle, killing the remaining Americans.

Broke handed over command of the Shannon to Lieutenant Provo Wallis. Though wounded, Broke was able to save the life of a young American midshipman who had slid down a rope from the fore-top. With American resistance weakening, Lieutenant Charles Leslie Falkiner, who had commanded the boarders who had rushed the main-deck, took command of the prize. While the two yard-arms had been locked together, Mr Cosnaham, who had commanded the main-top, had crawled out on the main yard-arm where he could fire down onto the Chesapeake, killing three of her men.

The British then secured the ship and took her surrender. The engagement had lasted just eleven minutes. Shannon had lost 23 killed, and had 56 wounded. Chesapeake had about 60 killed, including her four lieutenants, the master and many other of her officers, and about as many wounded. Captain Lawrence had been mortally wounded by fire from Shannon’s fore-top and was carried below before the Chesapeake was boarded. His last order upon being wounded was "Don't give up the ship!".

[Berthier]

"Captain Broke, at the head of not more that [sic?] twenty men, stepped from the rail of the waist-hammock netting to the muzzle of the after-carronade of the Chesapeake, and sprang from thence upon her quarterdeck."

- luckily for them no one was left to man the carronade otherwise no one would have made it over.

"along the top-masts of the ships as rival sharpshooters fired upon the their opponents in their rival's masts...... The British marksmen, led by Midshipman William Smith, who had command of the fore-top, stormed the Chesapeake's fore-top over the yard-arm and killed all the Americans there."

- this is the stuff of swashbuckling movies to storm another ship across the yardarms. Not for the faint of heart.

[csadn]

The other instance of the RN taking the USN one-on-one -- but it took the best frigate in the RN (Broke went so far as to pay for extra gunnery drills himself) going against the worst in the USN (the crew hadn't been paid in months, and were bordering on mutiny) to pull it off. :)

Also: Some will claim this is an instance of a "Humphreys frigate" being defeated. In fact, _Chesapeake_ had been built under the eye of Josiah Fox, who despised Humphreys and all his works; Fox saw fit to alter most of the Humphreys design features -- which resulted in _Chesapeake_ being the single worst of the "six frigates" initially built for the USN (and this after _United States_'s false keel was damaged during launch).

[The Cowman]

Interesting tale...

[David Manley]

but it took the best frigate in the RN (Broke went so far as to pay for extra gunnery drills himself) going against the worst in the USN

yeah, yeah, excuses, excuses.... :)
At least this was a fair fight, and not a victory over a ship half its size or firepower :D

[Anav]

half???

[David Manley]

OK, an exaggeration for effect, but you know what I mean.

[Old Salt]

Good one, enjoyed the reading.

[Bluedevil]

Yup! Nice read! :D

[csadn]

yeah, yeah, excuses, excuses.... :)
At least this was a fair fight, and not a victory over a ship half its size or firepower :D

Wasn't entirely the firepower -- was also the armor (or, in the British case, the lack thereof); US frigates, since SoLs could not be afforded, had armor belts comparable to other nations' SoLs, while other nations' frigates were "Thin-Wall Specials".

Also: Every time I've seen this battle played out with _Chesapeake_ having a proper crew... well, let's just say crew quality was the overriding factor in this battle. :)

[swarbs]

This is incorrect csadn. No ships of the time has armor in any sense. Until the age of shell guns, gunnery didn't sink ships, so armor wasn't a part of warship design.

Warships were built tougher than merchantman, but mostly because their decks had to bear the weight of cannon and their scantlings had to hold up to the recoil of those great guns. US 44-gunners had heaver timbers than the smaller British frigates, but they were not comparable to that of ships of the line. When the French and British began to build 44's of their own, they also had stouter hulls than the smaller ships. In the war of 1812, the heaviest hulls among ships around the big frigates' firepower belonged to the razeed British liners that were cut down to one deck of guns in an attempt to deal with the big US frigates.

[csadn]

This is incorrect csadn. No ships of the time has armor in any sense. Until the age of shell guns, gunnery didn't sink ships, so armor wasn't a part of warship design.

I was using "armor" in the general sense -- the stuff used to keep cannonballs and such out of the manned areas. I suppose I could have gone for the technically-correct explanation, but it would have required writing a minor treatise on the topic. :)

Also: Gunnery could, and did, sink ships in that period -- ever wonder why _Constitution_ didn't bring back _Guerierre_ or _Java_ after its battles? Admittedly, it could take some time to accomplish, but....

And speaking of technicalities: Technically, *anything* can be used as "armor"; it's just a question of "will it actually stop incoming fire?". It isn't AoS, but: At the American Civil War Battle of Galveston, the Confederate naval force used gunboats armored with *cotton bales* -- and defeated the Union force sent against them:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Galveston .

The technique worked mainly due to the low muzzle velocity (relatively) of period artillery.

"So what I told you was true -- from a certain point-of-view." :)

[David Manley]

Getting into technicalities, in the design of modern warships we use the term "armour" when we are referring to material over and above what is required for more mundane purposes, such as basic structural strength, watertight integrity etc. Where protection is given to a compartment, equipment etc. by what is already there we'd tend to refer to that as inherent protection, whilst the thickening of plate or the addition of separate appliqué would be referred to as armouring. So, in modern parlance the thick sides of a heavy frigate or a SoL would technically be "inherent protection" rather than "armour" since it was there for structural integrity reasons rather than specifically to defeat incoming fire - that it did was a fortunate happen-stance for whoever was behind it :)

[csadn]

Getting into technicalities, in the design of modern warships we use the term "armour" when we are referring to material over and above what is required for more mundane purposes, such as basic structural strength, watertight integrity etc. Where protection is given to a compartment, equipment etc. by what is already there we'd tend to refer to that as inherent protection, whilst the thickening of plate or the addition of separate appliqué would be referred to as armouring. So, in modern parlance the thick sides of a heavy frigate or a SoL would technically be "inherent protection" rather than "armour" since it was there for structural integrity reasons rather than specifically to defeat incoming fire - that it did was a fortunate happen-stance for whoever was behind it :)

Ah, but the US frigates were *deliberately* overbuilt -- since the US at the time couldn't afford SoLs (or at least enough to actually *form* a line-of-battle :) ), the frigates were built up to SoL-levels of protection.

Someone mentioned the "razee" design -- this approach was considered, but it had one salient flaw: The shape of a ship's hull has as much to do with its top speed as other factors. A SoL hull was not designed to be fast -- it tended to be blocky and unhydrodynamic; cutting the top deck off did not change this, so one ended up with a hull which was well-protected for its gun rating, but bog-slow and unhandy -- a "proper" frigate could outsail it, while a "proper" SoL could outgun it.

The Humphreys frigate design, OTOH, went the opposite direction: It took a "proper" frigate shape, and stuffed a small SoL inside. This included a severe thickening of the sidewalls (to where the normal frigate armament of the time would bounce off -- see comments during the _Constitution_/_Guerierre_ fight :) ), specifically for the purpose of defeating what was current in frigate armament; by the definition provided ("it was there [...] specifically to defeat incoming fire"), it was "armor" -- it wasn't referred to as such. (I suppose I could have alleviated this by putting "armor" in quotes in the first place; but I type slowly, and have only so much time available. :P )

[David Manley]

Thats a nice theory, but there's no evidence that they were built that way to resist gunfire. I posed the question to some colleagues who work or have worked at NAVSEA on various survivability projects, and who also have a deep interest in US naval history. Here's what I heard back from one of them (I got several replies all along the same lines, but this was the most comprehensive)

"I have been a student of frigates of the sailing navies for over 40 years and have a huge collection of material for the US, Britain, and French frigaes of the period. I would not agree with the overall flow of the argument at all, I do not agree that the US design was an attempt to make a mini "ship" of the line, and would never agree that the US frigates were built to resist cannon shot of any size.

Their is little doubt in my mind that the design was an attempt to make very fast frigate that better armed that the standard frigates around the world. The USN was going to get six ships - every possible opponent would have access to considerably more vessels including ships of the line. Traditionally, ships of the line could out sail frigates in rough weather. If these ships were to survive, they needed to be seaworthy enough to out sail the ships they could not fight and, at the same time, defeat any ship that might catch them. They were built to the same concept that the German armoured ships were in prior to WWII.

The large US frigates were overbuilt to ensure that could both carry the rig and sails necesary to move them at high speeds, and the weight of metal necessary to defeat any oposing frigate they might find themselves fighting. Certainly the demise of USS President to a squadron of frigates established that ships were not invulnerable to cannon balls from frigate sized guns - but of course, they were never intended to be. Rather, the design gave the ships' the structural integrity to "take a licling and keep on ticking" when in action as well as the ability to carry an then extraordinary brioadside weight of metal without that weight ultimately hampering the ship's ability to sail at high speed in even heavy weather over time.

Thus, virtually every component in the design was "overbuilt" - the hull frame and fittings, planking, deck, masts, spars, and rigging were all bigger, thicker, and tougher than those of their smaller relatives in foreign navies only because that is was was required to make the design successful while giving the vessels long lifetime, and thus justifying the considerably expense their building set back the naval appropriations and the US treasury."

So, in summary, whilst the ships sides were undoubtedly heavily built they were that way because that was what was required to support the armament, and rig, not to resist gunfire. that was a happy by-product.

[Anav]

David is correct. After talking to the current crew of Constitution it was all about carrying the extra weight of guns and masts. One of the reasons she is in good shape is also due to the extra hull and design of the supports in the hull.

[csadn]

Certainly the demise of USS President to a squadron of frigates established that ships were not invulnerable to cannon balls from frigate sized guns

Um -- this statement isn't quite correct: _President_ was not defeated in combat.

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com...president.aspx

When _President_ was attempting to cross the bar of New York Harbor, it ran aground, and spent something like two hours getting pummeled by the winter storm which had blown up (forcing the British away from their blockade, and giving Stephen Decatur an opportunity to slip away). The result of this was severe damage to _President_ -- loss of copper from the hull bottom; masts were twisted and cracked; the hull itself was bowed ("hogged", in the parlance of the day). In short, _President_ was not the ship it had been before the accident.

That said, when the British squadron finally caught up with _President_ the next day, the first ship to engage (HMS _Endymion_, a frigate armed with 26 24-lb. guns, designed specifically as a response to US "heavy frigates", altho' based off a French design) got slapped around rather badly, losing most of its rigging to fire from _President_, as well as 11 men killed and 24 wounded; and this with _President_'s powder being mostly defective (from both the storm damage and, um, "other causes"), and being aimed away from the hull -- there is argument over what _President_ might have done had it also "aimed low". (_Endymion_'s gunners, aiming for _President_'s hull, managed to kill 24 and wound 55, including Decatur.) That's worth repeating -- with defective powder and crippling hull damage, _President_ was still able to knock out of the fight an equivalent British frigate.

Decatur, for his part, surrendered not because of the engagement with _Endymion_, but because he knew his ship was sufficiently damaged it could not outrun the British ships to begin with (as _Constitution_ had once done early in the War), and was barely able to stay afloat, much less fight (that it barely made it to the West Indies post-battle is not often mentioned). The matter was not helped when the British announced that _Endymion_ had in fact beaten _President_ in a stand-up one-on-one fight; that statement was patently untrue, and everyone involved knew it.

As to making the US frigates proof against all fire: Even its designers knew that wasn't possible -- not even a SoL could stop a 24-lb. ball at close range (and the less said about the carronades, the better); the idea was to make it proof against *other frigates*, which carried 18-lb. cannon or smaller -- if a SoL hove into view, the US frigate cracked on sail, and *ran*. So I'm guessing the whole "US frigates were cannonballproof" meme came about from the usual source -- misinterpretation of a comment (probably by a politician :) ).

[David Manley]

Hmm, so President was under fire from Pomone and Tenedos when she struck, but she wasn't defeated in combat. Riiiiight :)

[Berthier]

Technically the Graf Spee wasn't defeated either....

Ducking from the canister blast overhead...:)

[David Manley]

LOL, Nor Bismarck, I guess, if you follow the same logic :D

[csadn]

Hmm, so President was under fire from Pomone and Tenedos when she struck, but she wasn't defeated in combat. Riiiiight :)

_President_ surrendered -- *then* _Pomone_ stuffed two broadsides into it. So, not only did the British fail to defeat _President_ in a stand-up fight, _Pomone_ was guilty of a war crime....

Technically the Graf Spee wasn't defeated either....

Quite true, actually -- _GS_ sailed into Montevideo under its own power, and its own flag; when Uruguay violated neutrality by refusing _GS_ its rights to repair under the Hague Conventions, Langsdorff scuttled it. (Pope's _The Battle of the River Plate_ suggests _GS_ could have fought its way out; the most-dire damage was to the forward rangefinder, plus a couple of holes in the hull below the waterline.)

LOL, Nor Bismarck, I guess, if you follow the same logic :D

Read Ballard's book _The Discovery of the _Bismarck__ -- the damage reports from the teams sent to fix the torpedo-hit on the aft hull confirm the ship was no longer manageable, and thus no longer combat-effective; the condition of the hull[*] makes clear the ship was scuttled, not sunk by gunfire; the return fire delivered by _Bismarck_ was solely so the crew could tell Adolf "we went down fighting".

[*: The hull is mostly intact, save for the aft 30'; this is consistent with a long, slow flooding of a ship's hull. A catastrophic flooding, as would be the result of the sudden inrush of water from gunfire, would result in a wreck closer to that of _Titanic_ -- the hull would be ripped open by the pressure of the water, and the compression of the air inside the hull.]

[Berthier]

Chris
Yes I understand GS scuttled. Her captain felt he was hopelessly outgunned and to fight would have been to sacrifice his crew for nothing.

I think it comes down to what defeated means. GS was strategically defeated but not tactically because that was not put to the test of final battle. Perhaps she could have fought her way out but being so far from a friendly base, unable to do anything but minor repairs, on balance of probabilities she was doomed if not in that action then before she reached a safe port.

Bismarck may have been scuttled but had been rendered combat ineffective by enemy action therefore was defeated. Who actually sent her to the bottom is a somewhat mute point.

President's action I am not familiar enough with so I would gracefully bow to the wisdom of those who do know more. I'll let you and David fight it out ;)

[David Manley]

Ok, a few points here.

1) Pomone was guilty of a war crime - tosh, Pomone ceased fire when Decatur ordered the ships lantern lowered to indicate her surrender. Cry "war crime" all you want, I don't think you'll find any serious student of the subject having the same opionion

2) Langsdorff actually believed that the most serious damage (in terms of effect on his ability to escape to home) was to the ships galley (wrecked by an 8" hit from Exeter) - he was seriously concerned at his ability to feed his crew on the voyage back to Germany. Of course his view on the watertight integrity of the ship flip-flopped between "no problem" and "crippling" depending on what approach eh was making to the authorities in Montevideo at the time - of course entirely reasonably since the diplomatic "battle" was just as important and valid as the military aspect.

3) Ballard's view isn't supported by many weapons experts who have assessed his evidence, which doesn't cover the whole hull anyway (much of it is concealed by mud). Cameron's survey supported Ballards, Mearn's survey said the opposite. And the experts in weapon effects (people who actually do this for a living, as I do, rather than theorists) and naval ship design in several countries with whom I've had the opportunity to discuss this, or who have assessed the evidence and made their views known in various fora side with the sinking through damage approach. The German crew may well have set charges and opened the ship up to the sea, but Bismarck was sinking anyway and all they did was hasten the end by a few minutes. It is claimed that the torpedo bulkheads aren't breached and whilst that might be true in terms of gross structural integrity (i.e. the strength in the bulkhead is still there and it is able to support its own weight and the weight of structure above it,) it almost certainly isn't true of its watertight integrity. I've conducted several trials where blast and shock damage has left a bulkhead apparently intact yet failures in weld seams and minor cracking has been enough to compromise the watertight integrity of the bulkhead and allow the inner compartments to flood. And several pre-war trials against prototype torpedo side protection systems showed the same effect (moreso since material technology in the 1930s and 1940s resulted in stiffer, less damage tolerant structures in which these types of failure were more likely to occur). Sinking through slow flooding from gunfire and torpedo damage can take a long time - trust me, I've been there, done that. The last SINKEX I participated in we shot up a target with a large number of medium calibre rounds and a couple of "big hitters". It took 2 days for the ship to sink and the wreck lies on the bottom (not all that far from Bismarck, actually) in generally the same overall condition. Scuttling has pretty much the same effect. It is after all, simply another way of letting water into the ship. You will see some implosion damage whether the ship sinks slowly or rapidly through a true catastrophic event (such as a magazine explosion) as it is related to trapped air and ability for that air to vent. I've walked on ships where this has happened and they've subsequently been recovered. Its quite an interesting effect, and its appearance can be quite confusing to those not familiar with it as it tends to lead the untrained observer to conclusions based on external air blast.

As far as I recall Titanic didn't suffer a sudden inrush of water, she sank over several hours. But then again her hull wasn't "ripped open by the pressure of the water".

[csadn]

Chris
Yes I understand GS scuttled. Her captain felt he was hopelessly outgunned and to fight would have been to sacrifice his crew for nothing.

According to the five sections of his letter to the German ambassador to Uruguay:

Section 1 states that Langsdorff believes he must leave at the time demanded by the Uruguayans.
Section 2 states the main damage is to the hull and (as mentioned) the bakery, and specifically states the ship's fighting capability was minimally hampered.
Section 3 states the constructors commissioned to repair the ship was prevented doing so by the Uruguayan authorities.
Section 4 reiterates his contentions of Uruguayan violations of neutrality laws, and his own strict adherence to same.
Section 5 is where he states plainly that since the Uruguayans will not permit him to make repairs allowed him by neutrality law, he must therefore scuttle his ship.

It is never stated, but it could be inferred, that the Uruguayans were being sockpuppeted by Britain -- that Britain was essentially telling them "We control the sea lanes -- do you want to be on our side, or theirs?"; and that for all practical purposes, _GS_ was in a hostile port, and was being set up to fail. Section 2 is particularly notable, as it is where he states plainly his ship's ability to still fight.

In short: Langsdorff believed he was being deliberately hamstrung by the locals, possibly acting on Britain's behalf; and that they would use whatever means were available to prevent him leaving, much less have a second round with the RN cruisers. His "defeat" was a triumph of diplomatic double-think, not force-of-arms.

Bismarck may have been scuttled but had been rendered combat ineffective by enemy action therefore was defeated. Who actually sent her to the bottom is a somewhat mute point.

The problem here is the narrative which has been provided for the past 50-60 years is so much British-written bushwah: The Heroic British Battleships take On The Evil German Battleship and defeat it in a fair fight. The actual story is: A single Fleet Air Arm Swordfish managed to put a torpedo into the weakest part of the German ship, damaging it beyond repair and leaving it unmanageable; the Germans then destroyed the ship themselves, but did so in a manner where, if they ever returned to Germany, they would not be stood up in front of a wall and shot for sinking their own ship. Meanwhile, the "traditionals" in the RN can point to the _Bismarck_ action and claim "battleships still have a role in the Navy" despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary (much the same way, 70 years later, there are still idiots out there who think the US Navy should have big-gun battleships for bombarding landing beaches) -- it is impossible to get someone to admit "my job no longer has any purpose", for obvious reasons.

President's action I am not familiar enough with so I would gracefully bow to the wisdom of those who do know more. I'll let you and David fight it out ;)

Not much to fight out there: _Pomone_ stuffed two full broadsides into a ship which had already given up; and even by the standard of the period, shooting up surrendered troops ended with a long walk off a short noose. There's some argument as to when _President_ brought down the lantern being used in lieu of a flag (being at night); however, I have yet to see a report claiming _President_ returned _Pomone_'s fire before hauling down the lantern -- and why would _President_ not fire back, unless it was either incapable of fighting, or unwilling to? Then there's the fact that the RN flat-out lied about the nature of the encounter, claiming _President_ had been taken in a fair fight by a single ship, as opposed to giving up to an entire squadron after being crippled on a reef. (If you want an example of what happens when two British frigates try to take on a reasonably-functional US heavy frigate, look up _Constitution_ vs. _Cyane_ and _Levant_.)

Oh, and I found the exact words of Joshua Humphreys re his frigate design, p. 49 of _Six Frigates_ by Ian Toll:

"They are superior to any European frigate, and if others should be in [the enemy's] company, our frigates can always lead ahead and never be obliged to go into action, but on their own terms, except in a calm; in blowing weather our ships are capable of engaging to advantage double-deck ships."

I can easily see how this might be corrupted into "our frigates are proof against whatever the enemy may throw at them" by some half-wit politician trying to curry favor with the voters over the latest appropriations bill -- what mother would not send her son to war on an "invulnerable" ship?

Churchill once said "A lie travels halfway 'round the world before the truth even puts on its boots"; study history long enough, and you'll learn how right he was.

[Berthier]

Quote:
Section 2 is particularly notable, as it is where he states plainly his ship's ability to still fight.

In short: Langsdorff believed he was being deliberately hamstrung by the locals, possibly acting on Britain's behalf; and that they would use whatever means were available to prevent him leaving, much less have a second round with the RN cruisers. His "defeat" was a triumph of diplomatic double-think, not force-of-arms.

I'm not sure I understand your point Chris. If he plainly could fight, but chose not to, regardless of what the locals were up to, then his decision not to fight and scuttle instead would seem to suggest he felt he couldn't win. We may actually be agreeing here I'm not sure!

[David Manley]

claiming _President_ had been taken in a fair fight by a single ship

You seem to get very hung up on "unfair fights". What on earth is not fair in taking on a superior vessel with multiple vessels of your own? To use my previous analogy, would it be unfair for several Shermans to gang up on a panther in NWE? No, of course not. and you could argue - very strongly - that a commander who didn't press home exactly this advantage was acting with reckless disregard to his men and his command.

Its worth reading Roosevelt's thoughts on the Pomone - President action. As you know he is generally less than complimentary about the British in his book (unsurprising since he was countering James whose bluster was less than complimentary about the US, but then again that is unsurprising as he was countering the post war US bluster on the naval events of the war), but then again he is quite even handed and is rather less than complimentary about Decatur as well. What is interesting looking at this (as just one of a number of decent references) is the total lack of any criticism of Pomone in the final acts of her battle with President. No criticism of the firing of the two broadsides, no talk of "war crimes" or "a long walk off a short noose" and indeed an assertion that President fired the last shot of the battle before striking -

On the same authority he states that the _President's_ fire was "silenced," Commodore Decatur stating the exact reverse. The point is fortunately settled by the log of the _Pomone_, which distinctly says that the last shot was fired by the President.

Now I suppose you could argue that Pomone's log had been deliberately falsified, but then again one could reasonably expect Roosevelt to jump on that if there was even a sniff of impropriety.And had t been such a dastardly act as you suggest then Decatur and his men would have have been the first to cry foul when they were repatriated. But they didn't. And on this that speaks volumes.

[Anav]

WoW. David you started a heck of a thread here!

[csadn]

[I]Quote:
I'm not sure I understand your point Chris. If he plainly could fight, but chose not to, regardless of what the locals were up to, then his decision not to fight and scuttle instead would seem to suggest he felt he couldn't win. We may actually be agreeing here I'm not sure!

My point here was: According to his account, the ship was capable of fighting, but not of long-distance travel; mention is made of damage to the bakery, and of some holes in the hull which could be problematic in a heavy Atlantic storm.

However, Langsdorff himself was convinced he was being set up by Uruguay (likely with British backing) to be forced out to sea in such a condition that _GS_ could not have returned to Germany, or much of anywhere, before either starving to death or being swamped in a storm -- in essence, "They couldn't kill us with gunfire; so they'll let Nature do it". Plus, Langsdorff knew that while the British could send ever-more ships to Uruguay, Germany could not. So, knowing he wouldn't be allowed to make even basic repairs, and knowing that eventually a ship which *could* defeat his would turn up, he took the only course left, and scuttled. Then, of course, he shot himself, knowing he'd be shot anyway for losing his ship.

Now, one might argue that another captain might have pressed the matter -- tried to take _GS_ back to Germany anyway, or at least to a different port whose owners were less likely to respond to British diplomatic pressure (for ex., there was an Argentine port just across the Plate mouth) to make repairs. This is where we run into the other major problem with Germany's Navy: It takes years, if not decades, to create a "proper Naval culture", to include the "big brass ones" required to take a shot-up ship and try to evade one of the larger navies of the period (including slipping past that Navy's homeland -- one of Germany's stumbling blocks to serious naval aspiration is: The British Isles are in the way). Germany -- espcially a Fascist Germany -- simply did not have the ability to create that kind of culture; they could create commanders with excellent technical skills, but creativity and "brass" was beyond them. Langsdorff was a product of that system: He couldn't see that in this situation, risks needed to be taken -- or, to borrow a line from a branch of the British military, "who dares, wins".

[csadn]

You seem to get very hung up on "unfair fights". What on earth is not fair in taking on a superior vessel with multiple vessels of your own? To use my previous analogy, would it be unfair for several Shermans to gang up on a panther in NWE? No, of course not. and you could argue - very strongly - that a commander who didn't press home exactly this advantage was acting with reckless disregard to his men and his command.

I don't have a problem with "unfair fights" -- I have a problem with people who claim an unfair fight was fair.

And just to be perfectly clear: Had the tables been reversed -- were it an American ship which had fired upon a surrendered British ship -- I'd still be calling the malefactor out on it. "That which I hate in others, I despise even more in myself".

As to "not pressing home advantages": Look at Lawrence's behavior in engaging _Shannon_ -- what the *HELL* was that moron thinking?

Its worth reading Roosevelt's thoughts on the Pomone - President action. As you know he is generally less than complimentary about the British in his book (unsurprising since he was countering James whose bluster was less than complimentary about the US, but then again that is unsurprising as he was countering the post war US bluster on the naval events of the war), but then again he is quite even handed and is rather less than complimentary about Decatur as well. What is interesting looking at this (as just one of a number of decent references) is the total lack of any criticism of Pomone in the final acts of her battle with President.

Roosevelt was a diplomat, among other things. :) He understood the notion of "fighting words", and came from a culture where such words would lead to fighting; so he was a bit more circumspect in his language.

No criticism of the firing of the two broadsides, no talk of "war crimes" or "a long walk off a short noose" and indeed an assertion that President fired the last shot of the battle before striking - Now I suppose you could argue that Pomone's log had been deliberately falsified, but then again one could reasonably expect Roosevelt to jump on that if there was even a sniff of impropriety.

There's been much discussion over the years of just what happened that night -- it was night, and matters were confused. Knowing Decatur was somewhat arrogant (or, as was said at the time, "Strong-willed"), there's likely some embellishments to his side of the affair, but pretty-much every report I've ever read says Decatur had surrendered, and was in the process of hauling down the lantern when _Pomone_ fired.

And had t been such a dastardly act as you suggest then Decatur and his men would have have been the first to cry foul when they were repatriated. But they didn't. And on this that speaks volumes.

Actually, Decatur *did* cry foul, but not on the _Pomone_ issue; his complaint was over reports that _Endymion_ had not only engaged _President_ alone, but had defeated it alone, which was *quite* clearly not the case. As noted, the War was over; one wonders what would have happened had this occurred before the War ended.

One fact I've learned from my historical studies: Never trust your primary sources -- between the inevitable confusion of the situation, and the less-than-entirely-honest nature of some of the writers, it's bloody-near-impossible to determine what actually happened.

[Berthier]

One fact I've learned from my historical studies: Never trust your primary sources -- between the inevitable confusion of the situation, and the less-than-entirely-honest nature of some of the writers, it's bloody-near-impossible to determine what actually happened.

Ah here we agree completely. There is a masterful account of the Battle of Waterloo by Mercer of the Royal Horse Artillery. He makes the point that although the battle raged for 8+hours and his battery was not involved all that time, he had no idea what was happening more than 100 yards from his position. Even this battle, perhaps one of the most heavily analyzed and most written about still has controversy over what happened and when. It is the nature of battle, the imprecision of human recall particularly in such a stressed state and the difficulties encountered when the frame of reference of the observers are positionally, socially and culturally different.

[David Manley]

Never trust your primary sources

Reminds me of an investigation I was involved in a few years back into the sinking of a WW2 frigate. Two survivors interviewed, one a young officer, one an AA gunner, both standing within 20 feet of each other at the time. One told me it was a lovely day, quiet, the ship just blew up. The other said he recalled seeing a Ju-88 fly over the ship, bomb doors open, "bloody big crosses, clear as day" , no warning, then the ship blew up. Both were picked up by a cruiser that reported intense AA activity. Reading the various witness statements it was as if they were reports from three completely separate incidents. In another a survivor was adamant he'd been on a particular part of the ship and seen an explosion elsewhere - despite a survey of the wreck showing the part he'd seen explode completely intact and the part he said he'd been standing on torn to pieces - he'd transposed what he saw and where he'd been.

it was night, and matters were confused.

Decatur *did* cry foul, but not on the _Pomone_ issue

was in the process of hauling down

Case closed. No surviving witnesses to question now, no witnesses at the time or since reported a crime. Anything else is just opinion and idle speculation (or the basis for a naff documentary on the History Channel :) )

[csadn]

Case closed. No surviving witnesses to question now, no witnesses at the time or since reported a crime. Anything else is just opinion and idle speculation (or the basis for a naff documentary on the History Channel :) )

As if "The History Channel" showed actual historical programming any more.... :P

Indeed, best to leave it lie, and get on with eliminating the real foe: Furries. >;)

[Mark Barker]

Very entertaining thread !

[QUOTE=csadn;2314] (If you want an example of what happens when two British frigates try to take on a reasonably-functional US heavy frigate, look up _Constitution_ vs. _Cyane_ and _Levant_.)


... and if you look up that example you will still be trying to find what happens when two British frigates take on the Constitution !


Cyane was a Sixth Rate carrying 22x32pdr carronades and 10x18pdr carronades, plus a couple of 'long 9s' as chasers. Normally rated as 22 guns she would have been called a corvette in most other navies.

Levant was even smaller - a flush-decked ship sloop (equivalent to the US Frolic class) and therefore not even rated, with 18x32pdr carronades and two 9-pdr chasers.

By comparison most frigates were 5th rates of 36-38 guns carrying main batteries of 12 or 18 pounder long guns. Constitition with her main armament of 24-pdrs completly outmatched both vessels, and I have never seen why this rated as one of Constitution's great victories.

Captain Stewart fought an excellent action in managing to capture both and not letting one get away, but his ship was never at any risk of defeat. His subsequent report on 'their superiority in weight and number of guns' pushed credibility, as admitted by the fair-minded American historian A T Mahan.

Light the blue touchpaper and retire ......

Mark Barker
The Inshore Squadron

PS Getting back to Shannon and Chesapeake, the point is always made that Chesapeake would have won if only she had shipped a decent crew. Look at the detail gunnery returns of the damage to both ships and you will see that she fought well and scored many hits. Broke had trained his crew for seven years, and his ideas on directed gunnery were years ahead of their time. Somehow he even managed to maintain morale when burning captured ships (therefore losing prize money) so he did not reduce his complement with prize crews.

I don't think a few months of training would have made a lot of difference, Chesapeake was taken apart by the best-trained frigate crew on the planet.

Could Broke and the Shannon have beaten the odds and even defeated a Humphreys frigate ? Well, that is a 'what-if' worth trying. He would certainly have given it a damned good try ...

[csadn]

Could Broke and the Shannon have beaten the odds and even defeated a Humphreys frigate ? Well, that is a 'what-if' worth trying. He would certainly have given it a damned good try ...

When I was playing _WS&IM_ regularly, I did something similar: Give _Chesapeake_ an Elite, rather than Average, crew grade (in the game, most US crews are rated Elite, while most British frigate crews are rated Average -- not sure why); and have Lawrence not be so blasted chivalrous (deliberately surrendering the weather gage, among others). My results were: If _Chesapeake_ can get in some early chainshot hits, which load _Shannon_ is not permitted to fire, _Chesapeake_ wins handily (the normal historical result for a US-vs.-UK frigate fight -- the British frigate winds up dismasted, then gets seven bales of s*** knocked out of it); otherwise it's a open question as to who wins (half the time, the US wins; half the time, the British win). A simulation only, to be sure, but....

This would seem to support my main contention: Broke didn't win the battle, so much as Lawrence lost it. That is: Lawrence could have been fighting just about any British frigate, and his epic mismanagement of the fight, plus his godawful crew quality, would have ensured he would be best known for providing the battle cry for Oliver Hazard Perry rather than actually winning a battle. That he decided to engage in such foolishness against what is acknowledged by all as the single best frigate in the Royal Navy... well, stupid does tend to agglutinate. :) (I never did get a chance to run _Shannon_ against a Hull-led _Constitution_, or similar, so I don't know how that would play out.)

[Anav]

I think you take away to much from the Shannon. They were well trained and well led.

[David Manley]

This would seem to support my main contention: Broke didn't win the battle, so much as Lawrence lost it.

But you could say that about ANY battle. for example, you could say the Constitution vs. Java battle was "lost" by the British more than "won" by the US because the RN built lighter, less heavily armed ships than the US. yes, Lawrence was an idiot, but then again the entire war was something of a fool's errand so I guess his actions were in keeping with the times.

[csadn]

But you could say that about ANY battle. for example, you could say the Constitution vs. Java battle was "lost" by the British more than "won" by the US because the RN built lighter, less heavily armed ships than the US.

Not always; tho' it's the rare event where both sides are operating with (to quote Tommy Lee Jones) "heart and brain wired together cookin' full-tilt-boogie for freedom and justice". For instance: _Constitution_/_Guerierre_ -- I cannot find anywhere any indication either ship was in any way mismanaged, either in general operation or in the tactics of the battle; both captains were on the ball; both crews were as good as they were ever going to be; both ships were in decent nick. In that case, the result comes down to the simple fact that the RN frigate was built for scouting, while the US frigate was built to Kick Ass And Take Names. (For another: _United States_/_Macedonian_. It's worth noting that the early fights are generally better-handled that later ones -- a sign of "war weariness"?)

yes, Lawrence was an idiot, but then again the entire war was something of a fool's errand so I guess his actions were in keeping with the times.

See above -- neither Hull nor Decatur were so obliging (Hull held fire solely because he wanted his opening double-shot broadside to be sure of hitting).

And as much as I can find any war "funny", I find 1812 hysterical in that neither side got what it wanted (the western US did not take Canada; the RN did not get a "short, victorious war"), but both sides instead got what they *needed* (Britain retained Canada; the US got respect for its Navy). Message, perhaps? :)

[David Manley]

the result comes down to the simple fact that the RN frigate was built for scouting, while the US frigate was built to Kick Ass And Take Names.

But thats what I said. You could argue that the RN "lost" the battle because they built a ship that was clearly inferior to its opponent in a 1 on 1 situation. I'm not saying that is a "correct" interpretation, just pointing out that saying "so-and-so didn't win because the-other-guy lost" is something a cop-out argument that, IMHO, tends to unnecessarily detract from the opposition's achievement. Most likely unintentionally, but it does so all the same.

Message, perhaps?

Yes; politicians are manipulative b****ds who shouldn't be let loose with a jar of sweets let alone a country :)

[Anav]

The British buried Captain Lawrence in Halifax with full military honours; six senior British naval officers served as pall bearers. Although Shannon's surgeon had pronounced as fatal Captain Broke's head wound from a cutlass stroke, he survived; nevertheless he never again commanded a ship. Two-thirds of the men that followed Broke in the boarding party were wounded or killed. The casualties, 228 dead or wounded between the two ships' companies, were high, with the ratio making it one of the bloodiest single ship actions of the age of sail. It had the single highest body count in an action between two ships in the entirety of the war. The fact that it happened in 15 minutes is a sign of the sheer ferocity with which this battle was fought.

[csadn]

But thats what I said. You could argue that the RN "lost" the battle because they built a ship that was clearly inferior to its opponent in a 1 on 1 situation.

Maybe; but rarely is a disaster composed of a single element -- "it took everyone working together to lose this one". That British frigates were lightly built and armed is one factor; from what I remember of my readings, British frigate crews were also not as well-trained as SoL crews, as it was not expected they would fight (see not only their performance in 1812, but the Battle of Grand Port mentioned in the Mauritius Campaign); and in general the frigates were treated as "second-class" to the SoLs (leading to Nelson's exclamation re frigates, among others). Had Britain developed a system for fighting frigates as thoroughly as they developed on for SoLs, might such failures have been avoided?

[Anav]

Just like today the Captain is responsible for training his crew. Some do it better then others. Some are willing to pay extra to get the extra.
I think the frigate crews sent to America new that a line ahead battle was not going to happen. Some took the extra to get ready for a battle with the big 44's. especially after the first few losses.

[Berthier]

Additionally frigate captains were often younger and less experienced, cutting their teeth on a first major command after cutters/sloops etc.

[csadn]

Just like today the Captain is responsible for training his crew. Some do it better then others. Some are willing to pay extra to get the extra.
I think the frigate crews sent to America new that a line ahead battle was not going to happen. Some took the extra to get ready for a battle with the big 44's. especially after the first few losses.

No doubt, "when the army fails, it is the failure of the General". But how far up does one look? If the Captains see the Admiralty looks upon them as second-class citizens (or whatever term one prefers), why should the Captains show any more interest?

Like I said elsewhere, quoting _BASEketball_ : "It took everyone working together to lose this one." The Admiralty didn't favor frigates; so neither did the admirals, so neither did the captains. It took getting blitzed by the US heavy frigates for the RN as a whole to say "We are screwing this up", and start knuckling down. (Funny how "my lack of training is going to get me killed" gets a soldier's attention. :) )

[Anav]

Like I said elsewhere, quoting _BASEketball_ : "It took everyone working together to lose this one." The Admiralty didn't favor frigates; so neither did the admirals, so neither did the captains. It took getting blitzed by the US heavy frigates for the RN as a whole to say "We are screwing this up", and start knuckling down. (Funny how "my lack of training is going to get me killed" gets a soldier's attention. :) )

This is a silly comment. Any Captain, in charge of a horse cart or a battleship, will prepare his ship for war. He knows losing not only costs his life but the life of his crew. If he knows he is fighting alone he will ensure his ship is ready fight and win alone. True in the beginning the British may have been caught unprepared, But Shannon fought well. Lawerence wanted the fight and he got it. The loss is his for not preparing his crew better to fight. Accepting anything else dishonors the men who fought and died there. War is not a wargame where you just change the crew quality and suddenly history is rewritten.

[Berthier]

Of course the question could be looked at slightly differently. Were the captains of the small US fleet better captains as a cohort of officers? As there were so few ships to be led, the best officers may have taken these position (a meritocracy of sorts..barring all the politics involved in such appointments), whereas in the RN the captain of a frigate may have been the one of the best but it wasn't a given since he came from a pool of officers going through the RN command system form MS/Master up through commander/captain etc etc. Once made Captain the RN did not work on a meritocracy excepting that the Admiralty often had more captains than ships and could choose who got an active command.

My point then would be not that both sides didn't prepare their ships and crews to their best ability, but that perhaps, and I make no strong claim to validity only put it up for discussion, the ability of the US captains on the whole was superior to that of the RN frigate captains on the whole, simple based on the selection process. This is no way to deride the quality of the RN officers. The RN had a tradition of success by 1812 lasting 150 years and a system of teaching command that clearly worked overall, but the US fledgling navy only needed a handful of commanders whereas the RN needed hundreds.

[csadn]

Any Captain, in charge of a horse cart or a battleship, will prepare his ship for war. He knows losing not only costs his life but the life of his crew. If he knows he is fighting alone he will ensure his ship is ready fight and win alone.

And yet, as we've seen, history is filled-to-overflowing with examples of commanders who *didn't* do the necessary prep-work, before and/or during the battle, and got their heads handed to them by people who were (to whatever extent) less unprepared. Lawrence voluntarily surrendered the weather gage, and passed up at least one chance to rake his foe; the British commander at Grand Port tried to sail into a strange harbor under fire without a pilot; the less said about the Combined Fleet, the better; and so on. The simple fact is: Historically, battles are not won by the better side, but lost by the worse side; however, since it's invariably the winner who gets to write the history, the Official Record suggests the opposite.

[David Manley]

The Admiralty didn't favor frigates; so neither did the admirals, so neither did the captains.

Really? What on earth do you base that statement on? The frigate force was the real "front line", especially after 1805 and was ably supported by the Admiralty. Suggesting that frigates were "out of favour" flies in the face of reality.

[Anav]

The simple fact is: Historically, battles are not won by the better side, but lost by the worse side; however, since it's invariably the winner who gets to write the history, the Official Record suggests the opposite.

WHAT!

[csadn]

Really? What on earth do you base that statement on? The frigate force was the real "front line", especially after 1805 and was ably supported by the Admiralty. Suggesting that frigates were "out of favour" flies in the face of reality.

Excerpts from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of...e_18th_century (after 1756, any RN ship of 4th rate is counted as a "frigate", as such ships had been removed from the line-of-battle and in many cases were serving either "en flute" or as heavy frigates):

American Revolutionary War:
1779 HMS Ardent ( Royal Navy): The 64-gun third rate was captured on 17 August by the French Navy's Junon. (1/0)
HMS Montreal ( Royal Navy): The Niger-class frigate was captured on 1 May by the French Navy's Bourgogne. (1/1)
1781 HMS Richmond} ( Royal Navy): The Richmond-class frigate was captured on 11 September by the French Navy. (1/2)
1782 HMS Hannibal ( Royal Navy): The 50-gun fourth rate was captured on 21 January by the French Navy's Héros. (1/3)
HMS Hector ( Royal Navy): The Hector-class ship of the line was captured by the French Navy (2/3)
HMS Iris ( Royal Navy): The frigate was captured on 9 September by the French Navy's Heron. (2/4)
1793 HMS Thames ( Royal Navy): The Richmond-class frigate was captured on 25 October by the French Navy's Carmagnole. (2/5)
(NOTE: The Siege of Toulon occurred at this time; however the "capture" and "recapture" of French ships did not involve any naval combat
1794 HMS Alexander ( Royal Navy): Action of 6 November 1794: The 74-gun third rate was captured by the French Navy's Jean Bart. (3/5)
1795 HMS Berwick ( Royal Navy): The Elizabeth-class third rate was captured on 7 March by the French Navy's Alceste, Minerve and Vestale. (4/5)
HMS Censeur ( Royal Navy): Action of 7 October 1795: The Pégase-class ship of the line was captured by the French Navy. (5/5)
1798 HMS Ambuscade ( Royal Navy): Action of 14 December 1798: The 32-gun fifth-rate was captured by the French Navy's Bayonnaise. (5/6)
HMS Leander ( Royal Navy): Action of 18 August 1798: The Portland-class fourth rate was captured by the Frency Navy's Le Genereux. (5/7)

Excerpts from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of...e_19th_century :

1801 HMS Success | Royal Navy | 10 February 1801
A 32-gun fifth rate frigate .launched in 1781, captured by the French and recaptured by the British the same year. (5/8)
HMS Hannibal | Royal Navy | 6 July 1801
A 74-gun third-rate ship of the line of the British Royal Navy, launched on 15 April 1786, named after Hannibal Barca. Ran aground and captured during the first part of the Battle of Algeciras Bay. (6/8)
1803 HMS Minerve | { Royal Navy | 3 July 1803
A 40-gun frigate under the command of Captain Jahleel Brenton, (re)captured by the French navy after it ran aground chasing other ships. Originally a French ship, captured by British in 1792. (6/9)
1805 HMS Cleopatra | Royal Navy | 18 February 1805
A 32-gun Amazon-class fifth rate frigate of the Royal Navy, commanded by Sir Robert Laurie. Captured by Ville de Milan, commanded by Captain Jean-Marie Renaud. (6/10)
HMS Calcutta | Royal Navy | 25 September 1805
An East Indiaman converted to a 56-gun ship of the line. Captured by 74-gun French ship Magnanime, later ran aground and recaptured by British and set ablaze 12 April 1809 at the Battle of the Basque Roads. (7/10)
NOTE: (HMS _Guerierre_ would be here, except it was not captured; it had to be scuttled due to excessive damage.) (7/11)
HMS Macedonian | Royal Navy | 25 October 1812
A 38-gun fifth rate Lively-class frigate in the Royal Navy, captured by the USS United States commanded by Stephen Decatur during the War of 1812. (7/12)
HMS Java | Royal Navy | 26 December 1812
A Pallas class frigate, commanded by Henry Lambert, taken as a prize off coast of Brazil after its engagement with USS Constitution, commanded by William Bainbridge. (7/13)
HMS Confiance | Royal Navy | 5 October 1813
A 37-gun fifth-rate frigate captured on Lake Erie by USS Eagle (1812), commanded by Thomas Macdonough. (7/14)

So, just on losses alone, the frigates lost twice as many of their number as the SoLs.

But, as I've said elsewhere: That's not the whole story.

_Frigates of the Napoleonic Wars_ by Robert Gardiner (p. 181) quotes Broke as saying, "Our modern ships of war, particularly frigates, are not perhaps so well calculated for maneuvering as the old-fashioned ships were" due to an overemphasis of straight-line speed over turning radius; as well as mentioning the issues of crew size (British frigates were invariably short-handed), crew quality (as discussed elsewhere, Broke's crew was the breach rather than the practice), and certain design issues in the early British frigates (most lacked a spar deck, which deck allowed sail-handlers to operate without tripping over the gun crews, and vice versa; as well as the lighter-armament issue discussed elsewhere). This would seem to suggest not only that the British frigate force had problems; but that those problems were widely known, especially to those commanding the frigates; and that it took the unprecedented shellackings handed out by the US in the early months of the War of 1812 to finally convince the British naval establishment to fix those problems (building frigates with bigger guns and better internal layouts; and, as Nelson once put it, figuring out how to get sailors to fly to the colors in time of war instead of from them,so that crews were no longer undersized, nor drawn from the gutter-scrapings of the press gangs).

As to "most wars are Lost rather than Won": Pick any well-documented war, and take a close read through how the campaigns therein were handled. My preferred area of study is the American Civil War -- off the top of my head, I can name Shiloh (both sides), the Red River campaign (Union side), Bragg's invasion of Kentucky (Rebel side), Franklin (Rebel side -- oh dear god, the Rebel side), the Battle of the Crater (Union side), and Burnside Bridge at Antietam (Union side) as examples of how commanders set themselves up for failure, disregarding what the other side was doing. If I followed the French Rev/Napoleonic wars a little more closely, I could probably name half a dozen campaigns from there, as well (and not just the big-name Mongolian clusterfrags). According to myth, Sun Tzu once said "If the instructions and words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, the general is to blame. But if the commands are clear and the soldiers disobey, then it is the fault of the officers." Whether or not he did, the point is clear: Armies, like so many things, stink from the head down; so if one is trying to figure out why an army (or a navy) stinks, look to the command staff first.

[Anav]

So did General Grant win the war or did Lee lose it?