Due to side conversations on the event of the day of 16 May concerning Admiral Byng, I decided not to briefly summarize the engagement known as the Battle of Minorca, but to post two accounts directly from two online sources that contain many details of the battle.


The island of Minorca, in the western Mediterranean, had been captured by British forces in 1708 as a potential base and proved a convenient center for naval operations in that sea during the subsequent 45 years. By early 1756 a state of undeclared war existed between France and Britain. The French began making preparations for an invasion of England, which created much alarm. French leaders reached the conclusion, however, that such an operation might well prove impossible and so secretly prepared an attack on Minorca.

Although some hint of French intentions reached London, the British government was so preoccupied by the possible invasion of England that it ignored the signs. Only in March 1756 did the Admiralty decide to reinforce its small Mediterranean force. Ten ships of the line were prepared, and after various delays this squadron left Spithead on 7 April. Vice Admiral John Byng had command.

On 2 May Byng’s squadron reached Gibraltar, where most of the English Mediterranean ships had also assembled. They were already too late, as the French expedition had departed Toulon on 10 April. It consisted of 15,000 troops under the Duc de Richelieu and 12 ships of the line under Roland-Michel Barrin, Marquise de la Galissonnière. This French force reached Minorca on 17 April; the army quickly landed and soon occupied the island, the British garrison retreating within powerful Fort St. Philip, at the entrance to Port Mahon, which the French invested.

Byng left Gibraltar on 8 May without military reinforcements, as envisaged by the government. He made a slow passage eastward and arrived off Minorca on 19 May. He then made an unsuccessful attempt to communicate with St. Philip, but a French fleet of 12 ships of the line and 5 frigates under Vice Admiral Roland-Michel Barrin de la Galissonnière appeared, and Byng hauled off in line formation. Neither side, however, sought a night action.

The next morning, 20 May, found Byng’s fleet, now 13 ships of the line, under the lee of Minorca. The French were away to the south. The wind was light from the south. The French headed southeast, probably to clear the land and determine if Byng wished to fight. Byng followed.

About 10:00 a.m. the French tacked, and the two fleets approached on opposite courses. About 12:30, however, the wind veered to the southwest, thus heading the French, who were obliged to pay off to the northwest and take the leeward position. The two fleets passed one another at distant range, and Byng allowed his van to pass well clear of the French rear before signaling to tack together, intending to concentrate on the French rear.

In fact, the British van opened the action against their opposites in the French line, but the fourth and fifth ships in the line were disabled by French fire and, unmanageable, caused an obstruction for the ships behind them, creating a gap in the line and making it difficult for the rearward ships to join the action. The French van then ran to leeward, having damaged the rigging of British van ships. It was later joined by the French center when the British center and rear emerged from the smoke to fill the gap. Firing ceased about 5:30. No ship on either side was captured or sunk; many were damaged, one British ship quite severely. The battle was also the first in which the French deliberately fired at rigging to disable its opponent. The British suffered 42 killed and 165 wounded; the French 26 and 136, respectively.

The battle was not renewed. La Galissonnière’s instructions forbade him to take risks. On the other side, Byng was discouraged by the damage to his ships and, instead of remaining in the vicinity, where he could have acted as a constant threat, he decided to return to Gibraltar, sealing the fate of Minorca. St. Philip capitulated on 27–28 June. This action also resulted in Byng’s court-martial and subsequent execution.

http://ageofsail.devhub.com/blog/531...a-20-may-1756/

On May 19 at daybreak, Byng's squadron arrived in sight of Fort St. Philip. Byng at once despatched the Phoenix, Chesterfield and Dolphin to reconnoitre the mouth of the harbour, to pick up intelligence, and to endeavour to send ashore a letter to general Blakeney. Captain Augustus John Hervey, the senior officer of the advanced squadron, drew in with the shore and endeavoured to communicate with the castle of St. Philip. Immediately, de la Galissonière took the sea with his fleet and advanced to meet Byng. When it appeared to south east of Byng's position, it forced him to call back his ships before they had time to make any useful observations. Byng then stood towards the French squadron and made the signal for a general chase. Both squadrons made sail towards one another and, at 2:00 PM, the British commander-in-chief made the signal for a line of battle ahead. But, the wind dropping, this order could not be properly carried out. In the meantime he took the precaution of reinforcing such of the ships as were most weakly manned, by means of drafts from the frigates, and he directed that the Phoenix, which had been reported as unfit for general service, should be made ready to act as a fireship in case of necessity. At 5:00 PM, Byng formed his line on which the French stood towards him in a regular line. At about 6:00 PM, the French advanced in order, with 12 ships of the line and 5 frigates; the van being commanded by M. Grandevez, the centre by M. de La Galissonnière, and the rear by M. de La Clue. An hour later, at 7:00 PM, the French tacked, and went away a distance of about 10 km, with a view to gaining the weather-gage; and Byng, to preserve that advantage, tacked likewise.

On the following morning, May 20, 2 French tartans, which had been sent out by M. de Richelieu with soldiers to reinforce M. de La Galissonnière, were chased by the Princess Louisa, Defiance and Captain; one of them being taken by the Defiance, and the other escaping. At daylight, the weather being hazy, the two fleets were not within sight of each other. Soon afterward, the French fleet (12 ships and 5 frigates) began to appear in the south-east. The wind was easterly heading southerly.

Byng called in the cruisers and, once they had joined him, tacked towards the French and formed the line ahead while the French were preparing to form theirs to the leeward, between the British and the harbour. Byng ran down in line ahead off the wind, the French remaining by it.
At noon, the British fleet had the advantage of the wind. As soon as Byng judged his rear to be the length of the French van, they tacked. Byng then ordered the Deptford to quit the line.
At 2:00 PM, admiral Byng made the signal to engage. At that time, the fleets were not parallel but formed an angle of from 30° to 40°. Byng planned to bring each ship against its opposite in the French line, asking the Deptford to quit the line in order to oppose the exact same number of ships to the French. This complex manoeuvre was made even more difficult by the important distance separating the two rears. Byng's whole line could not come into action at the same moment. When the signal was made, the van ships under rear-admiral Temple West kept away in obedience to it, and ran down for the French so nearly head on as to sacrifice their artillery fire in great measure. They received three raking broadsides and were seriously dismantled aloft. The sixth British ship (Intrepid) counting from the van, had her fore-topmast shot away, flew up into the wind, and came aback, stopping and doubling up the rear of the line.

The situation of the Intrepid obliged admiral Byng and all his division to fall aback, leaving the French centre unattacked and the British rear division quite uncovered. Byng ordered the Chesterfield to lay by the Intrepid and the Deptford to replace the Intrepid in the line of battle.

The French seized this opportunity to bear down on West's division with the van of their fleet. The French declined to come to close engagement preferring to destroy the rigging of the British ships at a distance. The engagement then degenerated into sporadic cannonades between ships. Meanwhile, Byng was lying a considerable distance astern from his rear. At 6:00 PM, the British fleet retired eastwards. De la Galissonière had been formally instructed to refrain from any pursuit in order to blockade the harbour. During the night, the Intrepid and Chesterfield parted from the fleet.

On May 24, Byng held a council of war on board the Ramilies. Considering that the fleet could not relieve Minorca and that Gibraltar would be in great danger if anything happened to the fleet, the council unanimously resolved to proceed to Gibraltar. On May 25, Byng set sail for Gibraltar. On the way, the squadron occupied itself in repairing such damages as could be repaired at sea. By withdrawing to Gibraltar, Byng virtually condemned the British garrison of Fort St. Philip who finally surrendered on June 28 with the honours of war.

http://www.kronoskaf.com/syw/index.p...tle_of_Minorca

John Byng:

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The Lines:

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The Battle:

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The execution of Admiral Byng:

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