ON THIS DATE 19 OCTOBER 1781 BRITISH SURRENDER AT YORKTOWN

[Cmmdre]

The Pivot Upon Which Everything Turned:
French Naval Superiority That Ensured Victory At Yorktown

By
William James Morgan




Preface

The Pivot Upon Which Everything Turned is reprinted through the courtesy of the original publisher, The Iron Worker, (Spring 1958) in honor of the two hundredth anniversary of the battle off the Virginia Capes, which took place 5 September 1781. Dr. William James Morgan, the author of this very timely monograph, served as a naval officer during WW II and the Korean War, retiring with the rank of Commander. Dr. Morgan is now the senior Historian with the Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C.

A specialist in early naval history, Dr. Morgan is the editor of the Naval Historical Center's on-going multi-volume Naval Documents of the American Revolution, as well as co-editor of the Autobiography of Rear Admiral Charles Wilkes, U.S. Navy, 1798-1877. He is also the author of Captains to the Northward; The New England Captains in the Continental Navy; Civil War Chronology 1861-1865; U.S. Navy Chronology, WW II; and numerous articles in historical journals, magazines and encyclopedias. Dr. Morgan is a frequent speaker before professional meetings, university audiences and other groups.

General Washington was at Chester in Pennsylvania on Seprember 5,1781 moving ahead of his southward marching Allied army when the great news he had been longing to hear reached him. Admiral Francois Joseph Paul, Comte de Grasse, commanding the French Navy in America, had arrived in Chesapeake Bay six days earlier with a powerful fleet of 28 ships-of-the-line and 3000 troops embarked.

The usually taciturn Washington embraced Rochambeau and waved his hat furiously in unrestrained joy. At last the naval superiority for which the American commander in chief had pleaded unceasingly, and which he termed "the pivot upon which everything turned," was a reality.

Since the opening months of the Revolution in 1775, while Washington watched the steady flow of supply ships and the King's men-of-war into Boston harbor, the patriotic cause had been hamstrung by Britain's absolute control of the seas. Naval power enabled the British to occupy New York, Philadelphia, Savannah, Charleston, and to strike at will anywhere along the coast. At the same time, Washington's ragged men were obliged to endure long forced marches and one dismal defensive campaign after another to keep the flame of resistance flickering.

The French-American Alliance of 1778 held out the bright prospect of a friendly naval force appearing to challenge the British stranglehold. French squadrons began operating on this side of the Atlantic immediately after the Alliance was formed, but for several disappointing years they were of insufficient strength, and for one reason or another nothing decisive was achieved. Nevertheless, Washington did not swerve from what was to him a fundamental principle --"whatever efforts are made by the Land Armies, the Navy must have the casting vote in the present contest." He sought every opportunity to urge a true naval superiority.

Toward the latter part of March 1781, Admiral de Grasse and 20 ships-of-the-line sailed from Brest, France, for the West Indian cruising grounds. On May 22 the Generals, Washington and Rochambeau, opened an all-important planning conference at Wethersfield, Connecticut. Whether or not de Grasse intended to come in force to the American theatre was not known to the military leaders.

Washington informed Rochambeau of his preference for a coordinated Allied land and naval attack against New York, seat of British administration in America. General Sir Henry Clinton's defensive capabilities at New York had been reduced by the diversion of troops and ships to the campaign in the Southern states.

Although the Wethersfield conferees set New York as the first objective "in present circumstances," they also agreed that the assault "may be directed against the enemy in some other quarter, as circumstances shall dictate." The "other quarter" to which the door was left open was, of course, the South, where at this time neither Washington nor Rochambeau could foresee that Lord Cornwallis would obligingly place his army on a narrow peninsula with its back to the water.

While preparations pointed at New York went forward along the Hudson after the Wethersfield meeting, the pieces leading to the drama of Yorktown began falling into place. By mid-June of 1781, Rochambeau had definite word, which he immediately passed on to Washington, that the French government had ordered de Grasse to bring the greater part of his fleet to North America.


Where and when the French naval force would appear off the coast was de Grasse's decision to make. However, in spite of Washington's known predilection for New York, Rochambeau helped shape the Admiral's thinking when he wrote: "There are two points at which to act offensively against the enemy: the Chesapeake and New York. The southeast winds and the distress of Virginia will probably cause you to prefer the Chesapeake Bay, and it is there where we think you can render the greatest service; besides, it would take you only two days to come to New York."

The swift and elusive frigate Concorde, acting as a courier, reached Newport on August 12 with dispatches making known de Grasse's intention to sail from Cape Haitien on August 3 (actually it was not until the 5th that he got underway) for the Chesapeake. De Grasse stressed that time was of the essence since a commitment to act with the Spanish in the West Indies precluded his remaining in American waters after October 15.

This was it. De Grasse was bringing a naval superiority to the Chesapeake, a "circumstance" provided for at Wethersfield, and which now dictated that the New York campaign be abandoned for the "other quarter." The French-American army broke camp and hastily started southward.

Meanwhile, unaware of the grand design taking shape against them, what moves were the British making? Cornwallis invaded Virginia from North Carolina in May 1781, and moved about the state while Lafayette and Wayne's small force snapped at his heels. By late August Cornwallis was encamped at Yorktown and fortifying that place as well as Gloucester on the opposire bank of the York River.

Lest we write off the English lord as a complete fool for putting his army in what proved to be an impossible position, let us record several salient facts. In the first place Cornwallis had been ordered by Sir Henry Clinton, his superior in New York, to occupy a naval station site in the Old Point Comfort--Yorktown area. Further, he was confident that Lafayette did not have the strength to contain him if he desired to move out, and he had no way of divining that Washington and Rochambeau were converging on him from the north. And lastly, but most significantly, he never for one moment entertained the thought that the Royal Navy would be forced to yield and abandon him. In short, there seemed to be nothing in the Yorktown situation which spelled "trap" to Cornwallis.

As soon as reliable intelligence established de Grasse's impending move to the American coast, Admiral Sir George Rodney, senior British naval officer on the West Indian station, detached a 14 ship squadron under Rear Admiral Samuel Hood as a reinforcement for New York. At this juncture, Rodney made a fatal miscalculation in estimating the size of the fleet de Grasse would bring to America. Consequently, he did not allow Hood a sufficient number of ships.

Admiral Hood departed Antigua in the West Indies on August 10, five days after de Grasse had sailed from Haiti. Both fleets took more or less parallel courses but did not fall in with each other on the northward passage. The coppered bottoms of the British ships made them faster sailers than the French. Hood reached the Capes of the Chesapeake August 25, took a look inside, found nothing amiss, and continued on to New York where the squadron passed under the command of the senior flag officer, Rear Admiral of the Red Sir Thomas Graves.

This then was the situation on August 30, 1781 when de Grasse's 28 ships entered Chesapeake Bay and came to anchor in Lynnhaven Roads. Cornwallis was digging in at Yorktown, and the British fleet numbering 19 line-of-battle ships was at New York. Washington and Rochambeau's combined armies had reached Philadelphia, while Lafayette waited in position to contest any attempt by Cornwallis to retreat into North Carolina. A French squadron, comprising eight of-the-line under Admiral de Barras, was at sea after clearing Newport for the Chesapeake on August 25 with heavy siege guns on board.

De Barras' direction made it clear to the British command that the major Allied effort was being aimed against Cornwallis. Admiral Graves' fleet weighed from Sandy Hook on the first of September hoping to snare de Barras enroute and still reach the Chesapeake before de Grasse. The French squadron out of Newport was not found, and the British held their southerly heading without incident to the mouth of the Chesapeake. On Wednesday morning September 5, the scout frigate Solebay signalled the presence of a fleet inside the Bay at anchor from Cape Henry to the Middle Ground Shoal. Standing on the quarterdeck of his 98-gun flagship London , all Admiral Graves had to do was rapidly scan a long glass over the forest of tall masts to recognize at once that this was not de Barras, but de Grasse with the main French body. The supreme moment was at hand.

If the Frenchman elected to come out and fight, as most assuredly he would, Graves held the tactical whip hand oft discussed over wardroom pipe and glass but seldom realized. The English ships were in open water bearing down before the wind. On the other hand, de Grasse's lumbering fleet had to gather up crewmen scattered around the harbor on various duties, take in their boats, prepare to get underway, and, when ready, beat out through a narrow channel a few ships at a time.

Graves could fall on the disordered French van in force as it straggled out; that is, "gang-up" on the first ships to clear the Bay. In this manner, de Grasse's superiority in ship numbers and weight of metal would have been nullified, and to use the language of military science, the French fleet might well have been destroyed "in detail," i.e. piece by piece.

A Rodney or a Nelson would not have muffed such a golden opening to land the knockout blow, but fortunate it was for American independence that Thomas Graves was neither. His tactical precepts were those of the Royal Navy's venerable and encrusted "Fighting Instructions," based on the classic concept of two opposing lines of battle with ship against ship slugging it out broadside to broadside in the manner of jousting knights. And this is how Graves would fight de Grasse. From the London went the Admiral's signal to form the "line of battle ahead," distance between ships one cable length (608 feet in the British Navy).

About noon the French fleet began standing out on the ebb tide. By two o'clock, the van and center, 16 ships including the huge 104-gun Ville de Paris in which de Grasse flew his flag, were well outside the Bay on an easterly course. Graves, still holding the weather gage, ordered his ships to wear, thus bringing the English line parallel to the French and on the same heading. De Grasse's lead ships were then opposite the English center, and Graves did not break the signal "bear down and engage the enemy" until the French line had advanced to a position where van opposed van.

The French ships were all out and formed up at four o'clock when the cannonade opened on both sides. Graves hoisted conflicting signals which utterly baffled the English division commanders and captains as to whether it was the Admiral's intention to maintain the strict line ahead or release ships to seek targets of opportunity. Therefore, the action never became general. Only the van ships were closely engaged, the centers partially at long range, and the rears not at all.

Darkness broke off the fight. Both fleets drifted with wind and water to the south taking stock of damages and casualties. Killed or wounded numbered several hundred on each side. No ship had been taken or sunk, although several were cut up severely, and a British 74, the Terrible, was in such distress that Graves ordered her to be destroyed by burning.

The day following the battle, the antagonists lay becalmed licking their wounds within sight of each other. For two more days de Grasse and Graves exchanged the weather advantage, yet neither showed any disposition to renew the engagement. The French and British commanders alike during this period seem to have suffered mental lapses regarding their primary missions which were, of course, for the one to hem in Cornwallis and for the other to rescue him if need be. This realization returned to de Grasse first. He crowded on sail and took the wind for the Chesapeake where he arrived on September 11 to find himself happily strengthened by de Barras' squadron.

Graves was shackled by indecision and, much to the disgust of his second in command (Admiral Hood), he delayed some forry-eight hours before following de Grasse. Once it was firmly established rhat the French had reentered the Chesapeake, a Council of War among the senior British officers considered "the position of the Enemy, the present condition of the British Fleet, the season of the year so near the Equinox, and the impracticability of giving any effectual succour to General Earl Cornwallis in the Chesapeake" and unanimously resolved to return to New York. From the hour of this decision, made necessary by the reentry of de Grasse into the bay, Cornwallis was lost.

As a naval engagement, the action of September 5 off the Virginia Capes was a mere brush rather than a head-on clash. Yet, in its results it has been called, and with good reason, one of the most decisive battles in world history--fought for the prize of a continent. Command of the sea, albeit local and temporary, passed to the French and American Allies. Neptune smiled on the Americans with a light that was to bring independence.

Washington hastened from Williamsburg, where he had joined Lafayette on September 14, to the Ville de Paris with warm personal congratulations for de Grasse. During the shipboard visit he extracted an agreement from the Admiral to remain in the Chesapeake until the end of October to prevent their quarry from making an eleventh hour escape.

Cornwallis found it hard to accept the fact that the stout wooden wall at his back was not the heretofore omnipotent Royal Navy, and that he had been left irrevocably to his fate. "Nothing," he said dolefully, "but the hope of relief would have induced me to attempt its [Yorktown's] defense." So the land siege with the thundering artillery bombardments, the digging of earthwork "parallels," customary sorties, and gallant storming of redoubts was played out to the inevitable conclusion. But this was anticlimactic, for as the British historian Captain W. M. James states: "the victory in the end was to the holder of the sea line of communications." Lord Cornwallis surrendered over seven thousand men on October 19, 1781.

When the last red-coated British trooper had stacked his arms, and the final drum beats of a melancholy march, "The World Turned Upside Down," had died on the crisp fall air, Washington gratefully wrote de Grasse to thank him "in the name of America, for the glorious event for which she is indebted to you ..." The Admiral responded with a masterful understatement: "I consider myself infinitely happy to have been of some service to the United States."

A GLOSSARY OF TERMS

BEAT OUT. To make progress against the wind by a series of zigzag courses.

BREAK THE SIGNAL. To display or fly a signal flag.

CENTER. That part of the fleet in the center of the line.

FORMED UP. To be in a line of battle preparatory to engaging the enemy.

HOLDlNG THE WEATHER GAGE. Keeping to the windward of your opponent; an advantageous position to maneuver a warship under sail.

KING'S MEN-OF-WAR. Regular vessels of the Royal Navy as contrasted to privateers.

REAR. That part of the fleet which forms the rear of the line.

SHIPS-OF-THE-LINE, or LINE-OF-BATTLE SHIPS. Largest ships in sailing navies; carried 74 or more guns on three decks; the "battleships" of their day; the ships which made up the line.

STANDING OUT ON THE EBB TIDE. Putting to sea by taking advantage of the flow of water as the tide runs out.

VAN. The part or division of a fleet which is in the front.

WEAR. To put a ship on the other track by turning her bow away from the wind.

Reprinted from this site.
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/pivot.htm

[Gunner]

"Washington gratefully wrote de Grasse to thank him "in the name of America, for the glorious event for which she is indebted to you ..." The Admiral responded with a masterful understatement: "I consider myself infinitely happy to have been of some service to the United States."

The understatement of understatements.

[David Manley]

A great strategic victory for the fledgling United States. A massive strategic suicide for the French regime, although not apparent at the time.

I recall seeing somewhere that the French artillery train at Yorktown was the largest concentration of artillery in a land campaign ever seen until that time. Is that correct?

[Gunner]

This is overkill but,

Artillery at the Siege of Yorktown (1781)





WEBPAGE UNDER DEVELOPMENT !!!

This page provides an abreviated, quantitative overview of the artillery deployed during the September-October 1781 American and French Allied siege of British positions at Yorktown, Virginia.
The content in this page is based upon recent research of Dr. Robert Selig and reported in two articles published in 2010 issues of the Journal of The Brigade of the American Revolution [more specifically cited at the end of this webpage].




American Artillery
Campaign Artillery
The artillery that arrived with the force under the marquis de Lafayette at Yorktown


On his way to join the marquis dc Lafayette, General Anthony Wayne sent George Washington a return of forces under his command on 26 May 1781. In it he informed the Commander-in-Chief that his artillery "consists of one Major, three Captains, six Subalterns, and ninety noncommissioned officers and matrosses, with six field pieces, i.e. 4 sixes and 2 threes." [6] One month later, on the eve of the Battle o Spencer's Ordinary, on 26 June 1781 Lafayette's army consisted of approximately 4,500 men, including "detachments from the Second and Fourth Continental [Artillery] Regiments" about 200 men strong, "with eight or ten guns." [7]
As Lafayette's forces were resting, about a week later, on the eve of the Battle of Green Spring "20 miles from Williamsburgh," Colonel Christian Febiger on 3 July 1781, provided this break-down of Continental forces: "On the I st instant, our army, consist [ed] of Campbell's brigade of militia, two brigades of regulars under Wayne and Muhlenburg, five pieces of artillery in park, Stephen's and Lawson's brigades of militia, and my detachment." [8] To these five guns must be added the three, possibly even four, pieces of the Fourth Continental Artillery: "Two pieces of artillery under Captain Duffy and Lieutenant-Captain Crossley of Pennsylvania and a third under Captain Savage of Massachusetts." [9]
Wayne lost two pieces of artillery at Green Spring [10] and one, possibly two pieces belonging to the Fourth Continental Artillery Regiment were diverted to General Nathanael Greene after the Battle of Green Spring. [11] This means that, during the Virginia Campaign of the summer of 1781, Lafayette must have had twelve or thirteen pieces of artillery available to him since General Henry Knox recorded after the conclusion of the Siege of Yorktown, that Lafayette's detachment had contributed the following artillery to the siege:
two 3-lb. guns
five 6-lb. guns
two 5 1/2-inch howitzers [12]


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
nine pieces [13]

Continental Artillery brought by Henry Knox
from Newburgh, New York


When Continental Army forces left their encampment around Greenburg, NY on 18 August 1781, Washington's forces included the Second Continental Artillery Regiment under Colonel John Lamb, some 160 men strong, and their artillery:
Its brass ordnance consisted of:
four 3-lb. guns
six 6-lb. guns [14]
two 12-1b. guns

three 5 1/2 inch howitzers
three 8-inch howitzers

six 5 1/2 inch mortars
two 8-inch mortars
ten 10-inch mortars

The iron ordnance consisted of:
twenty-one 18-1b. guns
three 24-1b.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
guns 60 pieces

This artillery was loaded on board vessels at Head of Elk on 8 September 1781. When the Continental Army marched on Yorktown on 28 September, Colonel Lamb and his 2nd Continental Artillery Regiment were still in the process of debarkation, even though they had entered the James River on 20 September already with much of the fleet bringing the Continental Army and the French grenadiers and chasseurs from Head of Elk. [15] But the sloop Nancy with two 8inch howitzers and most of the gun carriages on board got stuck on a sandbar and had to be partially unloaded to free her. [16] It was already 29 September -- the infantry was arrayed outside Yorktown -- when Lamb informed Knox that he had chosen Trebell's Landing, about half-way between Williamsburg and Yorktown on the James River, just to the west of Carter's Grove about six miles from Yorktown, to land his artillery. The "Brigade Order" dated "Burwell's Ferry, Virginia, 29th Sept. 1781" stipulated that "The Troops are immediately to disembark, at Trebel's Landing, and Encamp as contiguous to the Shore as may be convenient." [17] As Lamb's artillery landed over the next few days, even "the general's (i.e.,Washington's) own wagons and those of ...other Officers are employed in this service". Once landed, guns and carriages proceeded to Yorktown, where they began to appear on 2 October. [18]

Siege Artillery


The Continental Army had no siege artillery. [l9]
Total Continental Artillery: 69 pieces, including eight howitzers and eighteen mortars. [20]




French Artillery
Campaign Artillery
Admiral de Grasse's Artillery


During the Siege of Yorktown in September/October 1781, French campaign artillery consisted of artillery contributed by various sources.
Admiral de Grasse brought with him three regiments of Line Infantry and two companies of the First Battalion, Metz Regiment of Artillery, all of which had deployed to the Caribbean in 1776/77. These units, the regiments Agenois, Gâtinois and Tourraine, which stood under the command of the marquis de St. Simon, had not yet received their 4-lb. Gribeauval infantry support/battalion guns and arrived in the Chesapeake equipped with 1-lb. Rostaing guns. These guns were named after Philippe-Joseph, comte de Rostaing (1719-1796), a French artillery officer who had served in India from 1740 onward. Upon his return to France in 1747, he brought with him plans for a 1-lb. gun he had developed in India and which was subsequently named after him. [21] Though Rostaing had intended these guns for use with light troops, they were adopted by the infantry as battalion guns in the spring of 1759.
Following the conclusion of peace in 1763, the majority of these guns were shipped to the West Indies to be used as battalion or infantry support guns by the colonial infantry regiments but some were also set aside to equip naval troops and/or to serve as battalion guns to naval infantry. [22] When France deployed metropolitan line infantry units to the West Indies in 1776/77, they were sent there apparently without their regular 4-lb. battalion guns, which would have been Gribeauval 4-lb. guns, and subsequently equipped with 1-lb. Rostaing guns available in the colonies. This is confirmed in the journal of Lt.-Col. Dupleix de Cadignan, second in command of the Agenois, who recorded that, on 31 August 1781, that "les quatre pièces de canon à la Rostaing attachées à chaque régiment ... " ["the four cannon à la Rostaing attached to each regiment...."] Therefor a total of 12 cannon, were transferred from French naval vessels onto the Sandwich and landed near Jamestown. [23]

French infantry under the marquis de St. Simon

twelve 1-lb. guns of the type à la Rostaing.


Metz Regiment of Artillery that accompanied St. Simon


The campaign [field] artillery of the two companies of the Metz Regiment of Artillery, five officers and 99 men strong, in St. Simon's forces consisted of:
eight light 4-lb. guns à la suédoise
two 8-inch howitzers [24] of the système Vallière.


Total St. Simon Artillery includes 12 pieces with the infantry and 10 pieces with the Metz artillery detachment:
22 pieces.


The field artillery of Lauzun's Legion at Gloucester


Lauzun's Legion was a combined arms unit consisting of two escadrons (‘squadrons') of hussars, two companies of fusiliers, a grenadier company, a company of chasseurs, and a company of artillery consisting of six officers, i.e.,a capitainecommandant, a capitaine en second, a lieutenant en premier, a lieutenant en second, and two sous lieutenants plus the cadet gentilhomme. Its NCOs consisted of a sergeant-major, five sergeants, ten corporals, a frater, a fourrier-écrivain, two tambours and 144 gunners for a total strength of 171 officers and men. [27] A company of artillery consisted of two batteries of two cannon each, which should have given this artillery company four guns. Yet, the artillery equipment of Lauzun's Legion is still a matter of debate. No equipment list of Lauzun's artillery company is known to exist; but, in a letter of 2 October 1781, from Ware Church in Gloucester County, General George Weedon informed Washington that "we have not a single Field piece to our Troops except two small cannon belonging to the Duke, not more than two pounders." Weedon had years of service in the Continental Army and would have recognized a 4-lb. gun. [28] This means that, until further evidence comes to light, we must assume that Lauzun's artillery consisted of only two 1-lb. guns of the type à la Rostaing. To increase Lauzun's firepower, General Choisy asked Rochambeau to send four 4-lb. guns under two officers and 32 gunners to Gloucester where they arrived on 5 October 1781. [30] Until that date, the total Lauzun Artillery count must be assumed to be two 1-lb. guns.

The field artillery of the Auxonne Regiment in Rochambeau's forces


Among the forces of the expédition particulière which arrived in Newport, RI in June 1780 was the re-enforced Second Battalion of the Auxonne Regiment of Artillery. The re-enforcement was made necessary due to the fact that Rochambeau had four regiments of infantry (eight battalions) requiring sixteen 4-lb. guns and six howitzers but the regular equipment of an artillery battalion included only twelve 4lb guns and four howitzers. Altogether the Second Battalion of the Auxonne Regiment of Artillery brought 30 guns to Virginia. This was six more than its full complement of 24 pieces; which was eight 12-pounders, twelve 4-pounders, and four 6-inch howitzers. [26] All of these cannon were of the système Gribeauval re-introduced in the French artillery in November 1776.
This artillery, which had also embarked at Head of Elk, arrived in the James River on 26 September. Here, it was landed and hauled the short distance to Williamsburg. Following a day of rest, the combined armies set out for Yorktown on 28 September.
Rochambeau's campaign [field] artillery present at Yorktown


Rochambeau's campaign [field] artillery present at Yorktown consisted of adding resources of the infantry regiments, the re-enforced Auxonne Artillery regiment, and Lauzun's Legion that deployed from France to North America with Rochambeau in 1780; and the assests of the Metz artillery detachment and St. Simon's infantry which deployed from the Caribbean [with de Grasse]. These all came under Rochambeau's command at Yorktown in September-October 1781:
10 pieces of the Metz artillery detachment.
30 guns of the re-enforced Auxonne Regiment of Artillery.
12 pieces of St. Simon's infantry:
2 light guns with Lauzun's Legion at Gloucester
=====
54 pieces [includes six howitzers]


Siege Artillery

French Siege Artillery at Yorktown, October 1781


During the Siege, French Siege Artillery consisted of:
twelve 24-1b. guns
eight 16-1b. guns
four 8-inch mortars
seven 12-inch mortars [31]
two 8-inch howitzers
=====
33 pieces [NOT 34!!??]


These guns had sailed out of Newport, RI on ten transports in a fleet commanded by Admiral Barras on 24 August 1781 and snuck into the James River on 8 September while Admiral de Grasse was drawing Royal Navy vessels under Admiral Graves to the southward following the Battle of the Capes on 5 September. There they remained for the remainder of the month as a lack of draft horses and oxen made it impossible to land the heavy guns. Only the arrival of the American wagon train in Williamsburg on 3 October, and even more so that of the much larger French wagon train with its 660 oxen and over 1,500 horses on 6 October -- the day the first parallel was dug before Yorktown -- remedied the situation. As the siege artillery debarked it was moved immediately into prepared positions in the siege line. [32] This lack of transport animals explains why it is only on 9 October that Washington could record in his diary:
9th. About 3 o'clock P.M. the French opened a battery on our extreme left, of 4 Sixteen pounders, and Six Morters & Hawitzers and at 5 oclock an American battery of Six 18s & 24s; four Morters & 2 Hawitzers, began to play from the extremity of our right -- both with good effect as they compelled the Enemy to withdraw from their ambrazures the Pieces which had previously kept up a constant firing.


Total Allied Artillery


French Siege Artillery: 34 [?? 33] pieces.
French Campaign [field] Artillery: 52
TOTAL FRENCH ARTILLERY: 86 [?85] pieces.

TOTAL AMERICAN ARTILLERY: 69 [?68] pieces.
TOTAL ALLIED ARTILLERY: 155 [?154] pieces.




British Artillery
Campaign Artillery

During the Siege of Yorktown in October 1781, British artillery consisted of a mixture of 75 brass and 169 iron ordnance including cannon, howitzers, mortars, some on traveling carriages and some on garrison carriages as well as both mounted and not mounted howitzers and mortars. Most if not all of the iron ordnance was naval ordnance deployed on land to strengthen Cornwallis's position. [33]

The brass ordnance on traveling carriages consisted of:
one amusette [34]
twelve 3-lb. guns [35]
one 4-lb. gun [36]
twelve 6-lb. guns [37]
one 9-lb. gun four 12-1b. guns




Siege Artillery


The brass ordnance on garrison carriages consisted of:
three 4-lb. guns three 9-lb. guns

The howitzers on traveling carriages consisted of:
six 5 1/2-inch howitzers
three 8-inch howitzers


The howitzers not mounted consisted of:
six 8-inch howitzers

The mounted mortars consisted of:
eleven 4 2/5-inch mortars
seven 5 1/2 inch mortars
one 16-inch mortar



The mortars not mounted consisted of:
one 4 2/5 inch mortar
three 13-inch mortars
=====
Total 75 cannon,[including 15 howitzers and 23 mortars]

The iron ordnance on garrison or ship carriages consisted of:
two 1-lb. guns
three 3-lb. guns
eight 4-lb. guns
thirty 6-lb. guns
forty-two 9-lb. guns
eighteen 12-1b. guns
twenty-seven 18-1b. guns


The iron ordnance on travelling carriages consisted of:
one 18-1b. gun
one 24 1b. gun
four 4-lb carronades [38]
twenty-seven 18-1b. carronades
six swivel guns
======
169, [including 31 carronades and six swivel guns]

TOTAL BRITISH ARTILLERY: 244 pieces, 75 of them brass and 169 of them iron.




DISCUSSION ITEM : Summary Narrative
From 28 September to 17 October, a minimum of 403 pieces of artillery of all calibers, makes and models faced each other at Yorktown.
During the course of the siege, American and French batteries had fired almost 15,500 shells of all types and calibers into Yorktown. Many of the exploding shells had not detonated. Private John Hudson, who had served as a 13-yearold (he was born in 1768) boy-soldier at Yorktown in Colonel Goose Van Schaick's First New York Regiment, remembered in his old age how...
"We found hundreds of shells which had not exploded, from the circumstance of the fuse falling undermost, in which case they do not go off. Those we gathered up in wagons, and put them on board vessels to take to General Greene, who was still carrying on the war in South Carolina. There was a party of French prisoners who had gathered up a four horse wagon load of those shells. By some mismanagement, not easily explained, an explosion took place, which tore the wagon to fragments; killed the horses and twelve of the Frenchmen employed in the service. I saw those twelve men neatly laid out in a marquee all in a row with white linen burial clothes. This would not have been done for them, or anyone else, during the progress of the siege." [39]



DISCUSSION ITEM : Lauzun's Legion's Artillery
The volontaires étrangers de Lauzun, i.e., Lauzun's Legion, grew out of the volontaires étrangers de la marine set up on 1 September 1778. Both units were naval troops, and ordonnances regulating the artillery components of naval infantry stipulated 1-lb. Rostaing guns. Paragraph 37 of the ordonnance of 1 September 1778 establishing the volontaires étrangers de la marine however stipulated that each Legion was to have an artillery company equipped with "quatre pièces de canon à la Suédoise – four pieces à la suédoise." Not only are à la suédoise guns 4-pounders rather than 1lb. guns, of which we know none were left in French arsenals in 1778, all of them having been sent to America in 1777 when the French artillery reverted to the système Gribeauval. We do know, however, that there were 1-lb. guns à la Rostaing available in France which could have been used to equip Lauzun's artillery.
No equipment list of Lauzun's artillery company is known to exist; but, in a letter of 2 October 1781, from Ware Church in Gloucester County, General George Weedon informed Washington that "we have not a single Field piece to our Troops except two small cannon belonging to the Duke, not more than two pounders." Weedon had years of service in the Continental Army and would have recognized a 4-lb. gun. [28]
Why only "two small cannon"? The ordonnance creating Lauzun's Legion, on 5 March 1780, did not specify the number of guns for the artillery company; but paragraph 32 decreed that the stipulations of the 1 September 1778 ordonnance establishing the volontaires étrangers de la marine not explicitly addressed in the 1780 ordonnance were to remain in effect. This means that, based on paragraph 32, Lauzun's Legion should have kept the four guns -- be they à la suédoise or Rostaing -- assigned to the original légions in September 1778 rather than the two cannon identified by Weedon.
But Weedon is not the only eyewitness giving Lauzun only two guns. Joachim du Perron, comte de Revel, also recorded in his journal: "La légion de Lauzun avait aussi deux petites pièces à la Rostaing." [29] That's just what Weedon had written. Revel was a sous-lieutenant in the Regiment Monsieur-Infantry doing duty as naval infantry on de Grasse's fleet and among the 800 infantrymen detached by de Grasse to Gloucester. He knew what he was describing.


DISCUSSION ITEM : French Artillery Design Conventions
For much of the first half of the eighteenth century, the French system of artillery stood under the leadership of the Lieutenant-General Jean Florent de Vallière. His system, codified in an ordonnance of 7 October 1732, standardized the production of cannon to five models and calibers: 24lb., 16-1b., 12-1b., 8-lb. and 4-lb. cannon with the heavier artillery used as siege artillery and the smaller calibers as campaign artillery. The 4-lb. cannon was used as a battalion gun or infantry support gun in metropolitan regiments at two cannon per battalion or four per infantry regiment.
Prior to the introduction of the système Gribeauval in 1765, France possessed two types of 4-lb. guns. The standard or "long" M 1732 version of the 4lb. Vallière gun was 2.23 metres or 88 inches and weighed 1,150 French tbs., 280 times the weight of its cannonball. A gun of this size and weight quickly proved too unwieldy for infantry support on the battlefield; and. in 1740, the French artillery introduced a light 4-lb. cannon as an infantry support gun. A light field gun of this type was called à la suédoise after Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, who had pioneered the extensive use of light cannon for infantry support during the Thirty-Years' War.
Unlike the long 4-pound gun, the length of the light 4-pound gun was set at 1.62 metres (64 inches), or 18.5 times its caliber weighing 670 French lbs. By 1781, these eight light 4-lb. guns à la Suédoise of the système Vallière were the last guns of that type remaining in French service. All the others, i.e.,173 together with 21 long M 1732 guns, were sent to the American rebels in 1777. [25]
The système Vallière established in 1732 also included 8-inch howitzers while the système Gribeauval of 1765 had 6-inch howitzers. Since we know that the detachment of the Metz Artillery that had sailed for the Caribbean in October of 1776, i.e.,before the re-introduction of the Gribeauval system in November of the same year, was equipped with light 4-lb. guns à la Suédoise of the système Vallière, it seems reasonable to assume that the two howitzers that came with St. Simon's forces from the Caribbean were also of the 8-inch type.

[David Manley]

Ta for that - excellent stuff (and very useful for a friend who is looking to stage an AWI campaign game next year)

[csadn]

Not one, but two, examples of spectacularly bad judgment in this:

-- On sea, Graves's inability to see past The Book. (And, in general, Graves was an idiot: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_...t_Baron_Graves .)

-- On land, Cornwallis's inability to see he might possibly need to keep his line-of-withdrawal open. (The only time it might be acceptable to deliberately close off one's lines of retreat is in a situation like the Battle of San Jacinto in 1836, where Sam Houston needed to make sure there was no way for his army to escape save by going through Santa Ana's force.)